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CITY SANCTUARY RESOLUTIONS AND THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: MUCH ADO
ABOUT NOTHING1
I. INTRODUCTION
Following an October 1979 coup in El Salvador and the resulting
increase in violence, Salvadorans began fleeing their country in large
numbers.2 Since then, several hundred thousand undocumented
Salvadorans have entered the United States.3 Some Salvadorans crossed
the border and settled in American cities with aid from the "sanctuary
movement." 4 More than 200 churches, cities and other organizations
have publicly declared themselves to be sanctuaries.5
I. W. SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 127 (1975).
2. Jorstad, Sanctuary for Refugees: A Statement on Public Policy, THE CHRISTIAN CEN-
TURY, Mar. 14, 1984, at 274, 274.
3. Herrera, The Sanctuary Movement: When Religion and Politics Collide, L.A. LAW.,
Nov. 1984, at 22, 23-24.
4. Medvescek, What Next for Sanctuary?, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 20, 1985, at
188, 190-91; see also Goldstein, Sheltering Illegal Aliens, LIBERTY, May-June 1985, at 7, 9;
Herrera, supra note 3, at 24.
The sanctuary movement can be defined in several ways. Jim Corbett, a sanctuary leader,
considers the sanctuary movement "to be a grassroots network of people making individual
moral and religious choices," while the government views the movement as "civil disobedience
and a deliberate attempt to circumvent and embarrass U.S. foreign policy." Korn, Hiding in
the Open, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1986, at 25, 26. The goal of the sanctuary movement is "to
put public pressure on the U.S. government to change its policy toward [Latin American]
refugees and toward their home countries." Jorstad, supra note 2, at 275.
To attain this goal, the sanctuary movement engages in four types of activity. As an act of
compassion, sanctuary provides social services to people in need and haven from the conse-
quences of deportation. Second, the sanctuary movement resists what it believes to be unjust
foreign policy and unjust Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policy. The move-
ment claims that these policies violate the Refugee Act of 1980 and the United Nations Con-
vention and Protocol on Refugees. See infra notes 8-9. Third, the movement seeks to raise the
consciousness of the American people to the situation in Central America by exposing them to
the personal stories of refugees. Finally, the movement is an act of empowerment and of soli-
darity between Central and North Americans. Jorstad, supra note 2, at 275-76.
A recent book written by supporters of the sanctuary movement provides a more com-
plete background of the movement. See SANCTUARY (G. MacEoin ed. 1985). Reference is
made to this book only to establish the position maintained by the sanctuary movement. For
equally narrow but opposed views on the implications of the legal history of sanctuary, see I.
BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY (1985) and Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old
Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege? 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
747 (1986).
5. Jorstad, supra note 2, at 274-75. Many church people regard providing sanctuary as a
"duty of Christian conscience." Id. at 275. Members of the sanctuary movement prosecuted
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According to the United States Attorney General, providing sanctu-
ary constitutes a felony punishable by a maximum fine of $2000 and a
maximum prison sentence of five years.6 Sanctuary workers, however,
in Arizona attempted to argue that the free exercise clause of the first amendment protected
their activity. See infra note 18 and accompanying text; Herrera, supra note 3, at 25-26, 36
(brief discussion of some of the free exercise claims asserted by sanctuary workers in the Ari-
zona case); U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ."). In the Arizona case the judge ruled
that no evidence could be admitted on free exercise claims. 8 of 11 Activists Guilty in Alien
Sanctuary Case, L.A. Times, May 2, 1986, pt. I, at 18, col. 2 [hereinafter Guilty].
Many of the free exercise cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved claims as-
serted by people affiliated with a denomination outside the religious mainstream. See, eg.,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (application of polygamy statute to Mormons
upheld); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law against free
exercise claim of Orthodox Jew); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh Day Ad-
ventist may not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits for refusing to accept
work on Saturdays); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish children may not be
required to attend high school); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Wit-
ness may not be denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work in defense related indus-
try); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (government not required to exempt Amish
from payment of social security taxes); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(religious school may be denied tax exempt status because of its practice of racial discrimina-
tion).
Today, mainstream religions are developing a theology that addresses "social sin" and the
systemic violence against certain groups generated by oppressive social structures. Main-
stream religions have supported, in addition to the sanctuary movement, the antinuclear move-
ment and the current peace movement. Theology is becoming more activist and
confrontational. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER, A CALL TO ACTION
(OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS), May 14, 1971, reprinted in RENEWING THE EARTH: CATHOLIC
DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION 380 (D. O'Brien & T. Shannon eds. 1977)
[hereinafter RENEWING THE EARTH]; SECOND GENERAL CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERI-
CAN BISHOPS, THE MENDELLIN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS, reprinted in RENEWING THE
EARTH, supra, at 547-84 (liberation theology, although the subject of current controversy,
remains very influential); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE
OF PEACE, A PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR AND PEACE (May 3, 1985). If mainstream reli-
gions continue to become more activist and confrontational, the Court will need to begin
reevaluating its free exercise jurisprudence.
6. Jorstad, supra note 2, at 274. Federal law provides:
(a) Any person... who-
(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or
otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in
the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise;
(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing or
having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States
occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to
transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation or other-
wise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
(3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or at-
tempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, in any place, including any
building or any means of transportation; or
(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or
induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of-
any alien.., not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to
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maintain that these "refugees" have a right to remain in the United
States.7 The asserted basis for this claim is the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees8 and the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refu-
gee Act).9 Both define a refugee to be any person outside his or her coun-
try who can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution" due to
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular
social group.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) claims that most
Salvadorans are fleeing their homeland for economic, not political, rea-
sons.10 Further, the INS maintains that most Salvadorans cannot estab-
lish that their individual fear of persecution differs from the generalized
fear engendered by mere presence in a country divided by civil war."
Members of the sanctuary movement counter that racism against Latin
enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this chapter or any other
law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by im-
prisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to
whom any violation of this subsection occurs ....
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982).
7. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 8.
8. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees signed by the United
States assures certain protections to
any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of [sic] a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152, as incorporated in the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In particular, the Protocol pro-
hibits the expulsion of such persons unless "in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with due process of law." Id. art. 32(2). However, even expulsions meeting this requirement
are forbidden where the "life or freedom" of the alien would be threatened on account of race,
religion, political views, nationality or membership in a particular social group. Id. art. 33(1).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
The Refugee Act adopted the following definition of refugee:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such per-
son's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion ....
Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1I01(a)(42) (1982)).
10. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 8; see also Herrera, supra note 3, at 23, 36.
11. Temporary Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 4447 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1984) (statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) [hereinafter Hearings on Temporary
Suspension of Deportation]; see also Korn, supra note 4, at 27.
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Americans may be involved. 2 They also suggest that the Reagan Ad-
ministration hesitates to grant asylum to refugees from countries sup-
ported by the United States because of potentially embarrassing
implications.1 3 Another disputed issue concerns the treatment of
Salvadorans returned to their homeland.14 Reports by the American
Civil Liberties Union and Amnesty International indicate that large
numbers of deportees are tortured and murdered upon their return to El
Salvador. 5 Conversely, the State Department reports that deportees are
not being killed.16
The INS has infiltrated church groups to uncover information con-
cerning those involved in the movement and to track down aliens. 7 In
June 1985, in the first case in which a sanctuary worker was arrested,
tried and convicted, Stacy Merkt received two years probation and a sus-
pended ninety-day sentence for transporting illegal Salvadorans. In Feb-
ruary 1985, Jack Elder received a 150-day sentence to a halfway house
for assisting illegal entrance of "Salvadoran refugees." In January 1985,
after a ten-month investigation by the federal government, sixteen people
in Arizona-preachers, priests, nuns and layworkers-were arrested and
charged with seventy-one counts of conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens
into the United States. 8
During this time, several cities around the country added a twist to
the chasm separating the sanctuary movement from the Reagan Admin-
istration. In February 1985, the City of Berkeley, California, declared
12. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 8.
13. Id.; MacEoin, A Brief History of the Sanctuary Movement, in SANCTUARY, supra note
4, 26-27 (quoting Pastoral Letter issued by Archbishop's Office, Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 24,
1983)).
14. Herrera, supra note 3, at 37.
15. Hearings on Temporary Suspension of Deportation, supra note 11, at 130-3 5 (statement
of the American Civil Liberties Union); see also id. at 135-36 (statement of Amnesty Interna-
tional, USA).
16. Id. at 73-75 (statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).
17. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 7. Several churches have responded to INS infiltration by
initiating legal proceedings. These churches claim that this INS activity contravenes principles
associated with the free exercise clause while the INS justifies its actions by claiming that its
agents only attend meetings held to discuss the smuggling of illegal aliens. 2 Churches Sue
US. over INS Infiltration, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, pt. I, at 10, col. 1; see also supra note 5
(discussing free exercise claims of sanctuary members).
18. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 7-8. A jury found eight of these people guilty of various
crimes including harboring illegal aliens and conspiracy. Guilty, supra note 5, at 1, col. 1.
Despite the convictions, sanctuary leaders vow to continue their activities. The defense attor-
neys say that an appeal will be filed. Sanctuary Leaders Vow Fight Despite Convictions, L.A.
Times, May 4, 1986, pt. II, at 16, col. I [hereinafter Leaders Vow Fight].
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itself a "CITY OF REFUGE ' 19 for Central American refugees. Shortly
thereafter, the city council of Madison, Wisconsin, passed a similar reso-
lution establishing itself as a "City of refuge."2 Similarly, the city coun-
cil of Los Angeles, California, passed a resolution in November 1985
declaring the city to be a "City of Sanctuary.""z
The Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution, in particular, ignited a lot of
controversy. Much of the attention focused on Harold Ezell, Western
Regional Commissioner of the INS, who claimed that the city had in-
truded into foreign policy and that the city's action could result in a
massive influx of immigrants into Los Angeles.22 According to Ezell, the
sanctuary resolution was "tantamount to a City Council trying to be
their own immigration and naturalization service."23 To retaliate against
the passage of the resolution, Ezell threatened to seek federal legislation
cutting back federal funds to the city and considered filing a lawsuit.24
19. Resolution Declaring the City of Berkeley a Sanctuary, Feb. 19, 1985, infra Appendix
A. This resolution, passed by a vote of eight to one, refers to a resolution adopted by the City
of Berkeley in 1971. The council passed the 1971 resolution to provide sanctuary to sailors
who jumped ship during the Vietnam War. Berkeley Becomes a 'Sanctuary,' S.F. Chron., Feb.
20, 1985, at 14, col. 2. For the complete text of the 1971 resolution, see infra Appendix E.
20. Resolution Reaffirming Support for Efforts to Provide Sanctuary to Refugees Fleeing El
Salvador and Guatamala [sic], City of Madison, Wisconsin, Feb. 26, 1985 (passed by a vote of
17 ayes, 0 nays, 3 abstentions and 2 not present), infra Appendix B.
21. Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution, Nov. 27, 1985 (passed by a vote of 8-6), infra Ap-
pendix C. Cities that have taken some type of formal action in support of the sanctuary move-
ment include: Berkeley, Cal.; Burlington, Vt.; Cambridge, Mass.; Chicago, Ill.; Ithaca, N.Y.;
Los Angeles, Cal.; Madison, Wis.; New York, N.Y.; Olympia, Wash.; San Diego, Cal.; St.
Paul, Minn.; Tokoma Park, Md.; and West Hollywood, Cal. S.F. Supervisors Adopt Sanctuary
Resolution, L.A. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, pt. I, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Supervisors Adopt Sanctu-
ary Resolution]; Sanctuary: Reviving an Old Concept, L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1985, pt. VI, at 35,
col. I [hereinafter Reviving an Old Concept]. In total, approximately 20 cities have declared
themselves to be sanctuaries. New Mexico recently declared the entire state to be a sanctuary.
Leaders Vow Fight, supra note 18, at 16, col. 2.
22. Council Votes 8-6for L.A. Sanctuary, L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1985, pt. I, at 31, col. 1
[hereinafter Council Votes].
23. Id.
24. Plans to Penalize L.A. on Sanctuary Issue Questioned, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 1985, pt. II,
at 1, col. 5 [hereinafter Plans to Penalize L.A.]. Whether the federal government may constitu-
tionally retaliate by conditioning receipt of all federal funds by the city upon repeal of its
sanctuary resolution is a difficult question. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[tlo
lay and collect Taxes... to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
welfare of the United States." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court has broadly construed
the spending power. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (abandoning the
distinction between conditional appropriations and appropriations requiring binding promises
by the recipient); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (the spending power may be exer-
cised to provide for the general welfare). The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions may
place some limits on the federal spending power. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593,
596-98 (1972). This doctrine provides that the government may not offer a benefit on the
condition that the recipient forego some constitutionally protected interest. If the sanctuary
January 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:513
Such controversies25 resulted in the rescission of the original Los Angeles
resolution and the adoption of a more moderate proposal.26
This Comment analyzes the constitutional validity of these city
sanctuary resolutions vis-a-vis the supremacy clause and the federal pre-
emption doctrine. While the original Los Angeles sanctuary resolution
receives primary consideration, particular provisions of other resolutions
are considered where relevant.
IL CITY SANCTUARY RESOLUTIONS
A. Resolutions with Common Threads
Common threads tie together each of the sanctuary resolutions from
around the country.27 Each of the city council resolutions establish their
resolutions embody some such protected interest, a court would be compelled to invalidate any
condition in a federal statute making funds available to a city upon rescission of its sanctuary
resolution. Several grounds could be advanced that such a condition would compromise pro-
tected constitutional rights. First, the sanctuary resolutions constitute nonbinding expressions
of speech on the part of city council members and city councils. See infra note 165. Secondly,
the conditions would be unconstitutional to the extent that they contravene principles of feder-
alism. See infra note 182; see also Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1709, 1714 n.25 (1978) ("It is similarly improbable that the Court ... would ... sustain a
limitation on revenue-sharing confined to states that.., undertook to move the state capitol to
a location that, in the view of Congress, was more consistent with the 'general welfare.' ").
Finally, it may be that only funds related to the field of the sanctuary resolutions could be
made subject to such a condition. See, eg., infra note 113. The tenth amendment may require
a "close fit" between "the conditions attached to federal funds and the demand made of recipi-
ent states." Id. But see, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
84 n.27 (1978) ("Nothing in National League of Cities or in our prior due process cases pro-
vides any support for [the] claim" that because a statute "encroaches on substantial state gov-
ernment interests, an augmented standard of review under the Due Process Clause is
warranted."). At a minimum, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may re-
quire that there be at least some rational relation. See, e.g., id. at 83-84 (the Court should
"defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or irrational").
25. Councilperson Ernani Bernardi opposed the sanctuary resolution. He began collecting
signatures on a petition to place the sanctuary issue before the voters. Councilperson Michael
Woo, the author of the Los Angeles resolution, worried that such an action would be "racially
divisive." To avoid such an occurrence, Woo sought a compromise with Bernardi that ulti-
matey resulted in the rescission of the original sanctuary resolution and the adoption of a more
moderate proposal. Woo Sees a Compromise on Sanctuary Designation, L.A. Times, Feb. 6,
1986, pt. II, at 1, col. 1; see also infra note 26.
26. On February 8, 1986, the Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution was rescinded by a vote
of 11-1. Immediately after rescission, a unanimous city council adopted a similar resolution.
The new resolution, however, omits any reference to sanctuary. This "compromise" ended
Bernardi's push to have the sanctuary issue put on the ballot. L.A. Council Backs Down on
Sanctuary Plan, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1986, pt. I, at 1, col. 3, 26, col. 1 [hereinafter L.A. Council
Backs Down]. For the complete text of the compromise resolution, see infra Appendix D.
27. In fact, the City of Berkeley sent materials to the City of Madison which resulted in
the inclusion of clause 11. Letter from Councilperson Eve Galanter of the City of Madison to
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city as a "City of Sanctuary" or a "CITY OF REFUGE."28 Likewise,
each resolution establishes a policy of rendering city services to people
without inquiring into their citizenship status.2 9 Most of the resolutions
support some form of change in federal immigration policy.30 For in-
stance, the City of Madison "urges the Immigration Service to provide
the [Salvadoran and Guatemalan] refugees with the status of 'extended
voluntary departure.' "31 A statement of some degree of noncooperation
with the INS characterizes each of the resolutions.3 2 The Berkeley reso-
lution, for example, provides that "no employee of the City of Berkeley
will violate the established sanctuaries by assisting in investigations" or
arrests of those offering sanctuary or those provided sanctuary.33
Although similarities exist among the resolutions, so do differences,
particularly in tone. The tone of the Madison resolution seems independ-
ent, if not resentful, when it dictates that "the people of Madison will not
condone for its own citizens who are providing sanctuary the harass-
ment, indictments or arrests which have been experienced by sanctuary
workers in other cities at the instigation of the U.S. Immigration Ser-
vice."' 34  The Los Angeles resolution, discussed immediately below,
maintains a deferential tone throughout. 35
B. Anatomy of the Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution
The Los Angeles City Sanctuary Resolution contains two sets of
clauses-the "whereas" clauses and the "be it resolved" clauses. The
first whereas clause provides that "the United States of America has pro-
vided an enduring symbol of freedom for generations of people from
other countries who fear persecution in their native land on the basis of
their political beliefs."'36 The following clause declares that "the United
States Congress reaffirmed this tradition" in the asylum provisions of the
Mark Allen, Assistant to the Mayor of the City of Berkeley (Mar. 6, 1985). Compare Appen-
dix B, cl. 11, with Appendix A, cl. 10, which are essentially identical.
28. See Appendix A, cl. 11; Appendix B, cl. 9; Appendix C, cl. 15. The Los Angeles
compromise resolution deleted the provision designating the city as a sanctuary. See also supra
note 26.
29. See Appendix A, cl. 10; Appendix B, cl. 11; Appendix C, cl. 10.
30. See Appendix B, cl. 12; Appendix C, cls. 7-8, 12.
31. Appendix B, cl. 12. Bills pending before Congress would grant extended voluntary
departure (EVD) to various aliens now present in the United States. EVD would preclude
deportation of these aliens until hostilities in their homelands ceased.
32. See Appendix A, cl. 10; Appendix B, cl. 11; Appendix C, cls. 10-11.
33. Appendix A, cl. 10.
34. Appendix B, cl. 10.
35. See, eg., Appendix C, cls. 4, 7, 10, 13. Appendix F isolates the similarities and differ-
ences between the resolutions discussed in this Comment.
36. Appendix C, cl. 1.
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Refugee Act and quotes the Act's definition of a refugee.37 This defini-
tion, according to clause three, reflects a congressional intent to "include
political refugees and exclude economic refugees." '38 While this first sec-
tion recognizes that the primary responsibility for refugee programs rests
with the federal government, it also recognizes that local governments
"sustain the fiscal and social impact of large numbers of immigrants
seeking asylum from persecution. ' 39 The final whereas clause states that
"the climate of fear prevalent among Central American refugees pres-
ently living in Los Angeles" has several possible consequences: impair-
ment of the efficiency of Los Angeles City agencies, disturbance of law
enforcement and contravention of the city's "ideals of diversity and
tolerance."'
Ten resolution clauses follow the whereas clauses. The first resolu-
tion clause reaffirms the traditional American ideal of providing refuge
discussed in the first whereas clause.4" Clause seven resolves that the
city, without endorsing any of the contending forces, "goes on record in
opposition to the deportation of known law-abiding refugees who have
fled their homelands for fear of losing their lives."42 The eighth clause
reaffirms the city's support of bills pending in both houses of Congress
which would suspend deportation of certain Salvadoran nationals and
supports suspending deportation of certain Guatemalan nationals who
qualify as political refugees under the Refugee Act.4 The resolution ex-
presses appreciation for the humanitarian work of private social service
groups and religious institutions which have provided assistance to Cen-
tral American refugees in the Los Angeles area.'
The resolutions in clauses ten and eleven relate to city services.
Clause ten recognizes that "immigration and refugee policy is a matter of
Federal jurisdiction" and that "federal employees, not City employees,
should be considered responsible" for its implementation. 45 The city
council further "directs city employees to exclude refugee status as a con-
37. Appendix C, cl. 2.
38. Appendix C, cl. 3.
39. Appendix C, cl. 4.
40. Appendix C, cl. 5.
41. Appendix C, cl. 6. The Statue of Liberty and the poem inscribed on its pedestal sym-
bolizes these values associated with America as a land of opportunity, freedom and refuge. See
E. LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in EMMA LAZARUS: SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND
PROSE 40-41 (M. Schappes ed. 1947) ("Give me your tired, your poor .... Send these, the
homeless, tempest-tossed to me ... '9.
42. Appendix C, cl. 7.
43. Appendix C, cl. 8.
44. Appendix C, cl. 9.
45. Appendix C, cl. 10.
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sideration in their daily activities and routine dealings with the public"
but does not sanction "the violation of any law" or interference with law
enforcement.46 In the eleventh clause, the council commends the police
department "for adopting a policy of excluding consideration of the refu-
gee status of crime victims and witnesses who are law-abiding from the
Department's routine law enforcement activities" and urges fuller bilin-
gual dissemination of this policy. The council also "reaffirms the Depart-
ment's policy" of notifying the INS of only those undocumented aliens
arrested for serious misdemeanors or felonies. 47
Clauses twelve and thirteen direct messages to the federal govern-
ment. The first requests legislation clarifying the responsibility of the
INS "to approve asylum for applicants on the basis of the definition of
'refugee' in the Refugee Act of 1980" without regard to the "political
direction" of the "current government" of the refugee's country and its
current relationship with the United States. The resolution also includes
this message in next year's "Federal Legislative Program. '4 8 The second
message, directed to Congress and the President, requests consideration
of the fiscal needs of large urban areas, such as Los Angeles, "which have
borne a disproportionate share of the cost burden" of relocating
refugees.
49
The final two clauses establish a reporting mechanism and establish
Los Angeles as a "City of Sanctuary."' Clause fourteen directs the
"Human Relations Commission" to submit an annual report to the city
council on the status of immigrants and refugees residing in the city.5 1
The final clause, "as part of a national policy of providing refuge to per-
sons seeking asylum from political and not economic persecution," de-
clares that Los Angeles is a "City of Sanctuary for such persons."
5 2
C. Categorization of Resolution Provisions for Preemption Analysis
To facilitate discussion of the resolutions in general, each provision
46. Id.
47. Appendix C, ci. 11. More fully, the police department policy provides that a person
cannot be arrested for violating immigration laws and undocumented aliens cannot be sent to
the INS unless they are "booked for multiple misdemeanor offenses, a high-grade misde-
meanor or a felony." A City of Sanctuary, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1985, pt. II, at 1, col. 2
[hereinafter A City of Sanctuary]. High-grade misdemeanors include, for example, some pros-
titution offenses and driving under the influence of alcohol even though they may not consti-
tute felonies. Id.
48. Appendix C, cl. 12.
49. Appendix C, cl. 13.
50. Appendix C, cl. 15.
51. Appendix C, cl. 14.
52. Appendix C, cl. 15.
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has been placed in one of four categories: commendation, noncoopera-
tion, policy statement, and symbolic expression provisions.5 3 While com-
mendation provisions recognize the efforts of local groups providing
sanctuary and services to refugees, noncooperation provisions, for exam-
ple, urge city employees not to consider citizenship status in rendering
city services. Policy statement provisions express city support for vari-
ous legislation. Finally, declaring a city to be a "sanctuary" constitutes
symbolic expression. Each class of provisions implicates various con-
cerns relevant to a preemption analysis.
III. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Overview of a Troubled Doctrine
The supremacy clause 54 provides the constitutional basis of the fed-
eral preemption doctrine. This clause embodies the general principle
that the laws of the nation supersede the laws of the several states." The
doctrine of federal preemption determines under what circumstances fed-
eral law operates to invalidate state law.
Multiple formulations of the federal preemption doctrine 6 have re-
sulted in a large preemption lexicon 7 and a vast body of cases that are
difficult to reconcile. 8 The subsidiary question of statutory interpreta-
tion,59 predetermination of cases on the merits6" and the ad hoc nature of
the preemption inquiry61 combine with competing notions of federal-
53. See Appendix F which indicates the types of provisions included in each category.
54. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the Supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
55. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 292-96
(1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-90 (1978).
56. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624-25 (1975). This Comment uses the framework
for preemption analysis developed in that Note.
57. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) ("This Court, in considering the validity
of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of
the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.").
58. Note, supra note 56, at 624 ("The Supreme Court, however, has not developed a uni-
form approach to preemption; its decisions in this area take on an ad hoc, unprincipled quality,
seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis.").
59. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 535.
60. Note, supra note 56, at 638-39.
61. One commentator noted the ad hoc nature of the preemption doctrine as follows:
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ism62 to explain the polymorphism of the preemption doctrine. With the
exception of cases involving clear conflict63 or express statements of con-
gressional intent,' use of the judicial crystal ball to infer the intent of
Congress ensures continued incoherence.
This analysis recognizes that "[w]hile the touchstones invoked by
the Court can be delineated succinctly, there is no simplistic constitu-
tional standard for defining preemption parameters."65 As Justice Black
wrote, "[iun the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula."66 This analysis accepts the methodological implica-
tions of the belief that "[a]s adherence to a consistent principle in the
form of rules seems to be impossible in this area, perhaps the most princi-
pled approach would result if consistency's very impossibility were rec-
ognized, and a case-by-case approach openly adopted."67 The resulting
method relegates the rules of occupation of the field and the rules of
conflict to "variable factors" that aid analysis but do not substitute for
the balancing of federal and state interests.68
B. Rules of Occupation and Exclusivity
When a court establishes that Congress intended to occupy the field,
the supremacy clause operates to supersede the state law whether or not
state law impairs or conflicts with federal law.69 To establish that a field
is occupied, a court must determine that it is "'the clear and manifest
Preemption decisions pervade the entire range of federal regulation. Before a judicial
determination occurs, therefore, the Courts consider federal law and its operation
compared with the state statute and its operation. Then, the decision is based upon
the specifies of the relationship between the relevant statutory provisions within the
preemption framework. Of necessity the nature of the problem of discovering con-
gressional intent has resulted in judicial ad hoe balancing.
NOWAK, supra note 55, at 293; see also Note, supra note 56, at 652 n.212.
62. See infra note 89.
63. Clear conflict exists where a federal statute requires what a state statute prohibits or
vice versa. Anything short of this involves courts in ad hoc balancing to determine whether a
conflict exists.
64. Congress occasionally makes express its intention to preempt an entire field or to per-
mit concurrent state action. For an example of the former, see 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1982) (exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over licensed warehouses); for an example of the latter, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1982) (with stated exceptions, no act of Congress shall "be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any state law regulating insurance").
65. NOWAK, supra note 55, at 293.
66. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
67. Note, supra note 56, at 654.
68. Id.
69. Note, supra note 56, at 625; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (PG&E) v. State Energy
Resources & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (California moratorium on new nu-
clear plants not preempted by Atomic Energy Act).
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purpose of Congress'" that an area be regulated by federal law.70 Ab-
sent an express statement of intent,71 a court may infer congressional
intent.from the legislative history72 of congressional enactments or from
"objective factors' 73 such as the pervasiveness of the federal regulations,
the dominance of the federal interest and the danger of conflict with the
administration of the federal program.74 Finally, after determining that
the federal government "completely occupies a given field or an identifi-
able portion of it ... the test of pre-emption is whether 'the matter on
which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
Federal Act.' ,75 The real issue in occupation cases, however, is not so
much whether Congress occupied the field, but what field Congress has
occupied.76
The rule of exclusive power resembles the rule of occupation. A
determination that a particular power77 belongs exclusively78 to the fed-
eral government has the same effect on state laws touching that field as a
determination that Congress has occupied a field. To conclude that Con-
gress has occupied a field requires some action by Congress, 79 while a
determination that only the federal government may exercise power does
not require any federal action.8" The supremacy clause preempts any
70. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
71. See supra note 64.
72. For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court examined the legislative history of a
federal alien registration act. 312 U.S. 52, 69-73 (1941).
73. Note, supra note 56, at 625. These factors are referred to as objective factors because
they do not look to "expressions of congressional purpose or specific intent." Id. Such efforts
amount to statements of judicial power rather than powerlessness.
74. These factors were discussed in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947). In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the Court applied each of these factors in ruling that a
federal sedition act preempted a state sedition act. 350 U.S. 497, 502, 504-05 (1956).
75. PG&E, 461 U.S. at 212-13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236
(1947)) (emphasis added).
76. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting in Hines, stated:
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated formula that
Congress "by occupying the field" has excluded from it all state legislation. Every
act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field
before we can say that it has precluded [a state act]. To discover boundaries we look
to the federal statute, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative
history.
312 U.S. at 78-79. As applied to the analysis of the sanctuary resolutions, see infra notes 172-
220 and accompanying text.
77. For example, in Hines, the Court noted that the power over immigration and foreign
affairs resides exclusively in the federal government. 312 U.S. at 62.
78. Even where the power can be characterized as exclusive, a court must still characterize
that power in relation to the state statute at issue. See generally Hines, 312 U.S. 52.
79. In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-63 (1976), when the Court discussed this issue
of occupation of the field it appropriately considered federal legislation.
80. In De Canas, when the Court discussed the exclusive power of the federal government
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state action characterized as an exercise of a power residing exclusively
in the federal government." Nonetheless, the state enactment must be
closely examined to determine whether it touches upon an exclusive fed-
eral power. 2 While the rule of exclusive power may be simply stated, its
application is problematic.
Two factors influence the Court to hold that Congress has occupied
an area or that a power is the exclusive province of the federal govern-
ment. First, where the Court finds a power to be traditionally reserved to
state government because it concerns local matters, a state statute is less
likely to be preempted.83 Second, where the Court finds an area to be
traditionally reserved to the federal government because it concerns na-
tional matters, the statute is more likely to be preempted.84 These two
factors, in a sense, are the reverse and obverse of one another.
to regulate immigration it properly ignored federal statutes. Id. at 356-57 (California statute
penalizing employers of illegal aliens under certain conditions was not preempted by exclusive
federal power to regulate immigration). The Court noted that Congress may not authorize
state activity otherwise preempted by an exclusive federal power. Id. at 356.
81. See generally De Canas, 424 U.S. 351. In one case, the Court preempted an Oregon
statute providing for escheat where a nonresident alien claimed personalty unless certain con-
ditions were met, such as the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take
property on the same terms as the citizen of a foreign nation. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
421, 441 (1968). This statute constituted an intrusion into the exclusively federal field of for-
eign affairs because probate courts evaluated foreign governments and determined the credibil-
ity of testimony offered by foreign representatives. Id. at 433-34.
82. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.
83. NOWAK, supra note 55, at 294 ("Greater deference has been afforded regulation which
is traditionally parochial, i.e. health and safety measures."). In Maurer v. Hamilton, the Court
held that a state statute prohibiting transportation of cars by truck where a car extended over a
truck's cab did not conflict with the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulations. The
Court emphasized that the weight and height regulation concerned "public safety and health."
309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940). Compare Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 64 (1954).
Recent cases indicate that when a court characterizes a regulation as local in nature or as
being in a field traditionally reserved to the states, the statute has a high likelihood of being
sustained. See PG&E, 461 U.S. at 205 ("States retain their traditional responsibility in the field
of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other
related state concerns."); De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355, 356 (state statute penalizing employers of
illegal aliens under certain conditions characterized as a "local regulation" and within "police
power"). In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., holding that the federal Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972 partially preempted state design, size, and movement standards for oil tankers, the
Court said that "when a State's exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy
Clause, 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the State were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'
435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
84. See Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954) (interstate commerce); Hines,
312 U.S. at 73 ("treatment of aliens, in whatever state they may be located [is] a matter of
national moment").
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C. Rules of Conflict 8 5
The supremacy clause requires that federal law be given effect when
a conflict exists with a state law.8 6 Conflicts arise when state law requires
what federal law prohibits or prohibits what federal law requires. Con-
flicts also arise when a state law frustrates a federal goal.87 Careful atten-
tion must be paid to the federal and state statutes and their operation to
determine whether a conflict exists.88 If the idea of cooperative federal-
ism89 continues to emerge, the Court may be more inclined to balance
federal and state interests in determining whether a conflict exists.9° The
issue in conflict cases is not what should be done if a conflict exists, but
whether a judicially identifiable conflict exists.
D. The Role of Presumptions
One commentator suggested that the history of the Court's preemp-
tion decisions indicates that presumptions favoring either state or federal
interests have shifted over time.91 In the 1930's, federal interests tended
to be sacrificed in favor of state interests. The preference given federal
interests over state interests surfaced in the 1940's and continued to influ-
ence the Court's decisions throughout the 1960's. This commentator
contended that several cases decided in the 1970's indicated that the Bur-
85. Although the rules of conflict and occupation are presented separately, as formulated
and applied they frequently overlap. See infra note 221; Note, supra note 56, at 626 n.20.
86. PG&E, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
87. In PG&E, the Court presented conflict and frustration of purpose as separate grounds
for preemption. Id. at 217-23. This Comment considers frustration of purpose under the ru-
bric of conflict.
88. See supra note 76.
89. Cooperative federalism regards federal and state governments as "mutually comple-
mentary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended to realize
the current purposes of government according to their applicability to the problem in hand."
Wright, The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Unique Features and Policy
Orientation, 25 PuB. ADMIN. RaV. 193, 199 n.26 (1965). One writer has applied this notion to
account for the shifts in the preemption doctrine and presumptions favoring either federal or
state interests. Note, supra note 56, at 624. In PG&E, this idea of cooperative federalism
influenced the analysis of the Court. The Court noted: "Early on, it was decided that the
states would continue their traditional role in the regulation of electricity production. The
interrelationship of federal and state authority in the nuclear energy field has not been simple;
the federal regulatory structure has been frequently amended to optimize the partnership."
PG&E, 461 U.S. at 194.
90. In PG&E, the Court discussed the state's interest in regulating electrical utilities and
the federal government's interest in the "radiological safety" aspects of nuclear plants. 461
U.S. at 205. This discussion, however, occurs in the section in which the Court considers
occupation of the field as grounds for preemption. Id. at 205-16. Nonetheless, these conclu-
sions regarding state and federal interests are implicit in the Court's latter analysis of conflict
and frustration of purpose. Id. at 217-23.
91. Note, supra note 56, at 626.
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ger Court appeared to lean toward a preemption jurisprudence once
again favoring state interests.92 Several decisions during the last decade
indicate that this trend is continuing. 3 The existence of presumptions
which reflect a particular view of federalism should be addressed in ana-
lyzing the city sanctuary resolutions.
IV. PREEMPTION AND THE SANCTUARY RESOLUTIONS
A. A Preliminary View of Federal and State Fields of Interest
The characterization of federal and state fields of interest weighs
heavily in the preemption analysis. Characterizing a state interest as lo-
cal decreases the likelihood that a state regulation will be preempted,
while characterizing a federal interest as related to power over foreign
affairs or immigration makes preemption of the state law more likely.94
Whether a presumption favoring the federal or state interest arises de-
pends on how those interests are characterized. For purposes of balanc-
ing federal and state interests, the respective interests must be carefully
characterized. Characterization may be skewed to affect the outcome,
yielding a result-oriented analysis. 95 Because the true nature of these in-
terests cannot be evaluated in isolation, the federal and state interests
must be analyzed in relation to each other. But like a chameleon, the hue
of the interest changes as its background shifts.
1. Characterizing the field of federal interest
The federal government has exclusive power in the field of foreign
affairs and immigration.96 A lack of consensus as to the appropriate the-
ory justifying this conclusion has not impeded its assimilation into con-
92. Id. Cases cited by this commentator to support this latter proposition include: Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (denying exclusivity of the federal copyright power and
upholding California record piracy law despite federal legislation); New York State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (federal work incentive provisions of welfare
legislation did not occupy the field preempting state work requirement rules and remanding on
the question of conflict); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (federal patent
law did not preempt state trade secret law); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (California statute voiding forfeiture of benefits of noncontributory
profit-sharing plan not preempted by stock exchange rule adopted pursuant to Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934). See Note, supra note 56, at 639-53.
93. De Canas and PG&E seem to suggest that the Court is continuing along this line. For
example, in PG&E the Court characterized the state interest as local which proved to be an
element emphasized in the opinion. 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
94. See supra notes 83-84, 93.
95. See supra note 61.
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354
(1976) ("Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.").
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ventional judicial wisdom. In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court ruled that a
federal alien registration act preempted a state alien registration act.
97
The Court justified its decision, in part, on the basis of the Federalist
Papers and the Constitution.98 According to Alexander Hamilton, "the
peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members." 99 In the words of the Court, "[t]he Federal Govern-
ment, representing as it does the collective interests of the ... states, is
entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs
with foreign sovereignties.""
Theoretically, state activity touching the fields of foreign affairs and
immigration is automatically preempted by the exclusive nature of the
federal power without reference to actual federal action.101 In practice,
states do not regularly declare war on foreign nations nor limit by quota
the number of immigrants that can settle within their territory.10 2 The
difficulty arises in recharacterizing an otherwise legitimate exercise of the
state police power as an impermissable invasion of exclusive federal
power. Due to the complex ways in which federal and state governments
interact, the Court recognizes that state activity may have some effect on
foreign countries and immigration, but it may not have more than
"'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries' "103 and may not
amount to a "determination of who should or should not be admitted"
nor to "conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.""
Congressional laws enacted pursuant to the federal power over for-
97. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
98. Id. at 62 n.9. The Court cited The Federalist Papers nos. 3, 4, 5, 42 & 80. Id.
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1982) (emphasis in
original).
100. Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
101. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354-56.
102. States usually accomplish such claims more subtly. The role of California National
Guard troops in flying supplies during the past eight years on "non-combat" missions through-
out Central and South America has generated a lot of controversy. See, e.g., Guard's Missions
Catch Deukmejian by Surprise, L.A. Times, May 15, 1986, pt. I, at 3, col. 1; Guard Denies
Rumor of 2nd Hazardous Shooting, L.A. Times, May 14, 1986, pt. I, at 22, col. 1; State Guard
Flying in Latin Americafor 8 Years, Panel Told, L.A. Times, May 13, 1986, pt. I, at 3, col. 5;
Honduras Gun Incident Involving California Guardsmen Confirmed, L.A. Times, May 10,
1986, pt. L at 23, col. 1; Guardsmen to go to Honduras, Governor Insists, L.A. Times, April 17,
1986, pt. I, at 33, col. 1 (California Governor Deukemejian sent a 15 member unit to Honduras
to provide security and interpreters for a highway construction project). Similarly, states have
tried to limit the number of aliens within their territory by imposing various burdens on aliens
rather than by establishing numerical limits on alien residents. See, e.g., infra note 152.
103. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 (1968) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,
516-17 (1947)).
104. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355 (1976).
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eign affairs and immigration further restrict the field of permissible state
activity. Congress has asserted its power to enact many immigration
laws. °5 The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA), as
amended, serves as the basis for immigration law today.10 6 This act orig-
inally changed the formula for calculating immigration quotas and intro-
duced a system of entrance preferences. I0 7 Amendments added in 1965
limited the racial and national origin determination by establishing a uni-
fied quota for all countries outside the Western Hemisphere. 08 Today,
the INA represents a comprehensive and complex set of statutes gov-
erning immigration and naturalization.'0 9 However, the Court has held
that the mere comprehensiveness of the INA does not operate to preempt
state laws. 0
The Refugee Act' replaced the prior crisis-oriented approach to
assisting refugees" 2  with a comprehensive statutory framework."
3
105. Congress did not restrict immigration until adopting a statute in 1875 barring convicts
and prostitutes from entering the country. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed
1974). Seven years later, Congress adopted the nation's first general immigration statute
which introduced qualitative restrictions, excluding idiots, lunatics, convicts, and those likely
to become public charges. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214. After repeated amend-
ments, a new comprehensive statute was adopted in 1917. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat.
874 (repealed 1952). The 1917 Act retained the pre-existing qualitative restrictions and intro-
duced racial and national restrictions that characterized United States immigration law until
1965. Limitations on the number of immigrants were imposed with the passage of the Quota
Law of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952). In 1952, Congress adopted a comprehensive
immigration statute reflecting these developments in the law, the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Finally, in 1965, Congress abolished the national-origins quota system and prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of race or nationality. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (a) (1982)). See Note, Constitutional Limits on the
Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 961 n.22 (1982). For historical background
on these enactments, see E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY 1789-1965 (1981).
106. INA, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
107. Id.
108. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a) (1982)).
109. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359.
110. Id.
111. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For an
excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Refugee Act, see Anker & Posner, The
Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9
(1981). Cf infra note 220 (recognizing the problematic nature of attempts to discern legisla-
tive intent).
112. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S12,015 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen.
Boschwitz).
113. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. H1522 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Fish). In
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Avoiding the previously ideological definition of refugee, 114 the Act con-
tains the more neutral United Nations definition." 5 The enactment of
the Refugee Act represented a significant event in the jostling between
the President and Congress for control over the determination of refugee
and immigration policy." 6 Amidst continuing politicization of the deter-
mination of refugee status, 1 17 Congress attempted to balance foreign pol-
addition to relaxing restrictions on refugees and redefining the term refugee, the Refugee Act
provides assistance for refugee resettlement. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1522-1524 (1982).
114. The 1965 amendments to the INA established the first permanent basis for the admis-
sion of refugees. Section 203(a)(7) provided for the use of up to six percent of the total Eastern
Hemisphere immigration quota (10,200 visas) for the conditional entry of refugees under a new
seventh "preference" category. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1952) (repealed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(c)(7) (1982)). The restrictive nature of this requirement is reflected in the eligibility
standards contained within section 203(a)(7). The alien had to prove: (1) departure from a
communist-dominated country or from a country within the general area of the Middle East;
(2) the departure constituted a flight; (3) such flight was caused by persecution on account of
race, religion, or political opinion; and (4) an inability or unwillingness to return. Id.
Although the 1965 Amendments repealed the national origin formula and substituted a new
system of preferences, the refugee admission preference imposed restrictions based on geogra-
phy and ideology.
115. Compare the definition of refugee at supra note 114 with the definitions at supra notes
8-9. See also, eg., 126 CONG. REc. H1524 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Zablocki)
("The House amendment specifically broadened the U.S. definition [of refugee] to bring it into
line with the definition recognized by the United Nations ....").
116. Anker and Posner trace the legislative history of the Refugee Act illustrating how
Congress and the President struggled for control over immigration policy:
From the end of World War II until 1970, the history of refugee admissions into
the United States is the story of a series of temporary responses to emergency crises.
The national origins framework established for immigration quotas insured that any
legislative or administrative measures for refugees would be created on an ad hoc
basis. As time passed, however, the divergency in approach between the executive
and the legislative branches became striking. Insofar as Congress was willing to
make exceptions to the restrictive immigration policy of the post-war era, refugees
were admitted within narrowly circumscribed limits to discharge responsibilities to-
wards persons uprooted by the war, or as a gesture to the anti-communist preoccupa-
tion of the Cold War Era. Each legislative enactment was not to be viewed as "any
precedent or commitment." The executive branch, on the other hand, viewed refu-
gee admissions as an instrument of foreign policy. As a result, it had a more expan-
sive perspective on the United States' respohsibilities in refugee crises, and began to
bypass the formal immigration limits through the device of the Attorney General's
parole authority.
Anker & Posner, supra note 111, at 12-13.
117. Historically, the immigration and refugee policy of the United States has been tainted
by an overriding preoccupation with narrowly defined national objectives rather than with
humanitarian concerns. Id., supra note 111, at 9-20; see generally Kurzban, A CriticalAnalysis
of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865 (1982). The prejudice embodied in immigration
law is reflected in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case) where the Court
upheld a statute that operated to expel people from this country on the basis of race, 130 U.S.
581, 603-04 (1889). As the United States became a world leader at the turn of the century, a
series of laws dealing with immigration and refugees was enacted. These laws, and actions
taken pursuant to the laws, do not reflect a detached and disinterested concern for the welfare
of humanity. One writer suggests that the refugee "selection and admission process is pro-
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icy concerns and humanitarian needs within the statutory framework.""l
moted and ultimately molded by the unique value of refugees as political metaphors of alleged
communist oppression." Kurzban, supra, at 866-67.
Many of the post World War II refugee relief acts provided preferences for those fleeing
communist countries. For example, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allowed admission of refu-
gees including victims of natural calamities and those from communist dominated parts of
Europe and the Middle East. Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953); see also Anker & Posner,
supra note 111, at 13 n.12, 14-15. The 1965 Amendments to the INA, which established a
seventh preference in favor of refugees, was also defined in terms of ideological and geographi-
cal terms. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
For "emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest," the attorney
general may parole a "particular alien" into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5)(A)-(B)
(1982). Many commentators contend that the executive branch employs this power primarily
to advance United States "cold war objectives." See generally Kurzban, supra. Recent history
substantiates these claims. Between 1962 and 1979 more than 690,000 Cubans were paroled
into the United States. Similarly, between 1975 and 1979 more than 200,000 Indo-Chinese
refugees benefited from the parole authority. Likewise, parole programs were established in
this same period to admit anti-communist Chinese, Soviet Jews and Eastern Europeans. Id. at
871-72.
Those fleeing noncommunist countries have not received the same type of benefit from the
parole power. After the overthrow of the Allende government, fewer than 2000 Chileans were
paroled into the United States. S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979), reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141, 146. For a discussion of the United States
treatment of the Chileans during this period, see Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum
Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107 (1978). Some argue
that the Indochinese have been treated more favorably because they were fleeing communist
domination. Anker & Posner, supra note 111, at 28 & n.91. Prior to 1980, the United States
had admitted less than 10,000 refugees from Africa, the most refugee-ridden continent in the
world. Kurzban, supra, at 878.
The Refugee Act of 1980 provides legal recognition to refugee status and mandates estab-
lishment of a uniform asylum procedure to fairly evaluate asylum applications. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (1982). Unfortunately, the same ideological preoccupation that has dominated the pa-
role process appears to dominate the asylum process. In fiscal year 1981, one Salvadoran
application for asylum was granted. Note, Membership in a Social Group: Salvadoran Refu-
gees and the 1980 Refugee Act, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rnv. 305, 330 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Salvadoran Refugees]. In 1982, seven Haitians were granted asylum while 112 were denied
admission and over 6000 Haitian applications were pending. That same year, 1178
Salvadorans were denied asylum while 69 were granted asylum and 22,314 asylum applications
remained pending. Kurzban, supra, at 873 & n.45 (citing IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE REPORT: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982). From October
1983 to June 1983, 311 of 10,076 applications for asylum were granted to Salvadorans while
3401 of the 5358 Iranian applicants were accepted. Likewise, during this period, 92% of the
applicants from Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were granted asylum. Herrera, supra note 3,
at 36. In fiscal year 1984, 328 Salvadoran asylum requests were granted and 13,045 requests
were denied. During this year, 2.28% of asylum requests from Salvadoran nationals were
granted compared with an average of 30% of asylum claims granted for all other nationalities.
Salvadoran Refugees, supra, at 330 & n. 179 (citing figures compiled by ACLU Asylum Project,
Washington D.C. from INS statistics).
118. The Refugee Act intended, as with most statutes, to advance a variety of concerns:
The records from.., past [executive and congressional] debates are replete with
references to certain principles which became increasingly persistent themes. The
Refugee Act attempts to embody these themes by recognizing that principled, hu-
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Unfortunately, the Act's practical effect has been to further politicize de-
termination of refugee status."19 The perceived divergence between con-
gressional intent and the Reagan Administration policy has added fuel to
the sanctuary movement. 120 Nonetheless, the adoption of this Act is rel-
evant to a preemption analysis.
2. Characterizing the field of city interest
At least three of the four categories of sanctuary resolution provi-
sions can be characterized as strictly local. Commendation, policy state-
ment and symbolic expression provisions involve local activity.' 2, The
noncooperation provisions, however, arguably diverge from strictly local
concerns.' 22 All of these provisions, however, should be viewed as an
exercise of "historic" city "authority" or a "traditional" city "role"'
123
resulting in a presumption in favor of the local interest. 124
Commendation, policy statement and symbolic expression provi-
sions are the proper domain of city councils. In Farley v. Healey,125 the
California Supreme Court ruled that a San Francisco initiative measure
urging a cease-fire and American withdrawal from Vietnam was not be-
yond the power of the electorate to adopt even though that policy could
not be fully implemented by city ordinance.'26 Chief Justice Traynor,
manitarian considerations must inform refugee selection procedures; that the expedi-
ency of perceived, short-term foreign policy interest should not be the exclusive or
even primary criteria in refugee admission policy, nor should politicized decision-
making dictate asylum determinations; and that Congress and the public must be
assured of an appropriate, functional role.
Anker & Posner, supra note 111, at 88-89. Thus, many factors prompted adoption of the first
comprehensive statute addressing the needs of refugees.
One of the primary intentions of the statute was to depoliticize refugee admission.
Although the Act recognizes that the United States cannot accept an unlimited number of
refugees, admissions should be allocated in light of special humanitarian concerns. S. Rep. No.
256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141,
142. Providing part of the impetus leading to the passage of the Refugee Act was a concern
that refugee status should be provided for those fleeing right wing dictatorships. Anker &
Posner, supra note 111, at 27, 63.
119. See generally Kurzban, supra note 117.
120. The sanctuary movement views the INS as the organization violating the law by not
adhering to the Refugee Act and the United Nations Convention and Protocol on Refugees.
Jorstad, supra note 2, at 275; MacEoin, A Brief History of the Sanctuary Movement, in SANC-
TUARY, supra note 4, at 14.
121. See Appendix F.
122. See Appendix F.
123. PG&E, 461 U.S. 190, 194 (1983).
124. See supra notes 83-84, 92-93 and accompanying text.
125. 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967).
126. Id. at 329, 431 P.2d at 653, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 29. Although 21,000 electors signed the
petition to place the initiative on the ballot, id. at 326, 431 P.2d at 651, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 27, the
measure was "defeated by a vote of 136,516 (63%) to 78,806 (37%)." Note, Farley v. Healey:
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writing for the majority, claimed:
As representatives of local communities, boards of supervisors
and city councils have traditionally made declarations of policy
on matters of concern to the community whether or not they
had power to effectuate such declarations by binding legisla-
tion. Indeed, one of the purposes of local government is to rep-
resent its citizens before the Congress, the Legislature, and
administrative agencies in matters over which the local govern-
ment has no power. Even in matters offoreign policy it is not
uncommon for local legislative bodies to make their positions
known. 1
27
The Use of the Municipal Initiative as a Poll-Taking Device on Non-Municipal Issues, 5 CAL.
W. L. REV. 148 n.1 (1968) [hereinafter Municipal Initiative].
The primary issue in Farley involved interpretation of a city charter and the California
Constitution. 67 Cal. 2d at 328-29, 431 P.2d at 652-53, 62 Cal. Rptr. 28-29. The opinion is
also important for the language discussing the role of city governments and for the proposition
that the municipal initiative may be used to express opinions upon which the city could not
directly legislate. Municipal Initiative, supra, at 154. A Massachusetts court considered a
Cambridge initiative similar to the one in San Francisco and reached the same conclusion as
Farley. See Note, Vietnam Peace Petitions-Questions of American Policy in Vietnam Permit-
ted on Local Election Ballot, 3 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 183, 183 & n.2 (1967) [hereinafter
Peace Petitions]. The Supreme Court of Ohio also faced a similar initiative in a case where
there was no city charter provision to interpret. The court concluded that the measure could
not be placed on the ballot because the city could not enact the policy. State ex rel Rhodes v.
Board of Elections, 12 Ohio St. 2d 4, 230 N.E.2d 347 (1967).
Even though local initiatives may not have been historically used to measure voter reac-
tion to national policy, Peace Petitions, supra, at 185, city councils historically pass nonbinding
resolutions addressing national concerns. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
127. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 328, 431 P.2d at 652-53, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
The dissent disagreed with the majority's analysis of the use of the local initiative to access
public opinion on matters within the exclusive power of the federal government. Id. at 330,
431 P.2d at 654, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Burke, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the dissent acknowl-
edged that city councils traditionally pass resolutions that could not be enacted as binding
ordinances: "Admittedly, in the enjoyment of the much cherished and exercised American
privilege of speaking out without restraint, the minute books of such boards are replete with
recorded resolutions on every conceivable subject .... Id. at 334, 431 P.2d at 656, 62 Cal.
Rptr. at 32. (Burke, J., dissenting). Since such resolutions lack binding force, the dissent asks
and answers the following questions:
Why then are they allowed to pass such resolutions, we might ask? Acceptance of
public office does not cut off a person's right of free speech. And although from time
to time someone may question the use of public funds and facilities to record the
individual opinions of supervisors on matters outside the scope of their duties and
responsibilities, the cost to the local treasury of the adoption of such resolutions is
minimal. The opinion of the city attorney is not asked and understandably is not
volunteered on the legality of expenditures for such purposes; and the "resolutions"
make good news copy; hence, they continue unabated. This court should not permit
the past indulgence of boards in such practices to be used as a justification for peti-
tioners to force the taxpayers of a city to finance the taking of a public poll on a non-
municipal subject.
Id. Under the dissent's analysis, the Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution would not contravene
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Resolutions supporting federal legislation and commendations of local
groups constitute traditional city functions. City councils pass resolu-
tions to support lobbying on particular sides of many federal ques-
tions. 2 ' Michael Woo, the author of the Los Angeles Sanctuary
Resolution, stated that "[t]he council passes resolutions daily urging the
state and federal governments to take action that may be contrary to
existing policy."' 29 Likewise, the city council regularly recognizes
groups and individuals for service to the community.' 30 The commenda-
tion and policy statement provisions in the city resolutions, therefore,
ought to carry a presumption in favor of the state interest.
The declaration of a city as a place of sanctuary could be interpreted
in a way that does not seek changes in federal policy but replaces federal
policy. However, they are more reasonably viewed as nothing more than
a comment on the ideals valued by the city, another form of symbolic
action and an attempt to influence federal policy, rather than an immedi-
ate substitute for existing federal policy. Consequently, declaring the city
to be a sanctuary should be viewed as a local activity.
A similar analysis applies to each of the other Los Angeles Sanctu-
limitations on city council authority while the proposed Bernardi initiative would be pre-
empted. See supra note 25.
The dissent in Farley argued that use of the local initiative as a poll taking device on
national issues would precipitate the decline of local government because candidates would be
elected based on their stand on national issues as opposed to local issues. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at
334, 336, 431 P.2d at 656, 657, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 32, 33. The Los Angeles Sanctuary Resolution
precipitated hearings at the expense of council members' time and city money. The concerns
of these meetings turned city council attention away from strictly local concerns (arguably the
council's concern was local because of the vast number of aliens residing in the city) to federal
immigration and foreign policy. The Farley dissent correctly recognized that such city council
resolutions make "good news copy" and that the city attorney was not consulted as to the
legality of the expenditures associated with the hearing (although Mayor Bradley and the City
Council certainly sought or received some opinion as to the constitutionality of the resolution).
Analogous to the reasoning in Garcia, the political process should determine whether council
members spend time exercising their first amendment rights to pass nonbinding resolutions on
federal issues at the expense of the city. See supra note 182. Would you vote for a city council
member whose agenda included only balancing the federal budget, strengthening national de-
fense, funding the contras in Nicaragua, deregulating interstate commerce and increasing the
number of INS agents?
128. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 328-29, 431 P.2d at 653, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (San Francisco
resolution urged President Johnson to take all necessary action "to insure freedom of naviga-
tion for all countries in the Gulf of Aqaba"); Supervisors Adopt Sanctuary Resolution, supra
note 21, at 3, col. 1 (San Francisco city council voted 11-0 in favor of divesting interests in
businesses with ties to South Africa); Appendix E (1971 Berkeley resolution declaring city a
sanctuary for naval personnel during the Vietnam War).
129. Michael Woo, 'City of Refuge' is All-American, L.A. Times, Dec. 8, 1985, pt. V, at 5,
col. 3 [hereinafter City of Refuge].
130. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 328, 431 P.2d at 653, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (San Francisco resolu-
tion commended President Johnson "for his stand on the present Arab-Israeli crisis").
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ary Resolution provisions. Although these provisions could be viewed as
non-local activity, they are more reasonably viewed as local activity with
a corresponding presumption in favor of the city interest. For instance,
hearings are held to deport an alien. 3' At the hearing the government's
side and the alien's side are heard. The federal government has estab-
lished this mechanism. Cities should be free to support or oppose depor-
tation of those aliens illegally present who have contacts with the city.
1 32
The presumption in favor of local activity is least likely to attach to
the noncooperation provisions. Such provisions include the policy of re-
fusing to request information about citizenship status when providing
city services or when witnesses report crimes. Closer examination
reveals that the presumption in favor of state interests applies to these
provisions as well.1 33 City governments traditionally establish rules gov-
erning municipal affairs.'13  This role has been retained by city councils
131. See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b) (1982) (concerning proceedings to determine
deportability).
132. Alien rights can be analyzed under two models rooted in liberal social theory: the
governmental restraint model and the participation model. Special Projects, Immigration Pol-
icy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1286 (1983). The models address in different
ways the tension existing between the opposing liberal fears of unrestrained individual rights
and unrestrained governmental power. Under the governmental restraint model, governmen-
tal power serves to limit individual rights for the benefit of the common good. The participa-
tion model views government as a disinterested caretaker. These models have, in part,
divergent implications when applied to aliens. Cases reflecting the assumptions of the govern-
mental restraint model have generally permitted regulations of aliens so long as the threat
posed by aliens was greater than the threat posed to liberty by governmental action. The
participation model, on the other hand, recognizes that as an alien's participation in society
becomes greater the alien should thereby acquire more rights. This accretion of rights, de-
scribed as the political community doctrine, implies that illegal presence of an alien should not
alter the process of acquiring rights. For a fuller discussion of these two theories and their
foundations in case law, see id. at 1292-311.
Deportation hearings involve the presentation of two views. See supra note 131. Under
the participation model of alien rights, aliens acquire more rights as they become more integral
members of society. As an alien acquires more rights, it follows that the community to which
that alien belongs acquires a greater interest in her presence. Consequently, an alien may
become so much a part of the fabric of the community that the community suffers in the alien's
absence. Therefore, the community may have an interest in protesting the deportation of the
alien in the context of such a hearing despite the laws of the national community.
133. Reviving an Old Concept, supra note 21, at 35, col. 2 ("INS officials concede that cities
are not breaking any laws by declining to cooperate in the enforcement of federal immigration
statutes.").
134. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 330, 431 P.2d at 654, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Burke, J., dissenting).
The original California Constitution of 1879 permitted cities with populations in excess of a
certain figure to adopt a charter for their own government but the charter remained "subject to
and controlled by general laws." CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8 (1879). The Califorinia Consti-
tution currently provides:
It shall be competent in any charter framed under the authority of this section to
provide that the municipality governed thereunder may make and enforce all laws
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because they maintain a position enabling them to evaluate and respond
to local needs. For example, a city decides how many fire stations, if any,
are necessary and whether to inquire into citizenship status or determine
and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and
limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to general laws.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 80). In construing the meaning of "municipal affairs," courts fre-
quently recognized that cities were uniquely qualified to regulate those matters. See, e.g., Ex
parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 74 P. 780, 782 (1903). For a more complete history of these
constitutional provisions and California cases defining municipal affairs, see Sato, "Municipal
Affairs" in California, 60 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1055 (1972).
The difficulties associated with defining "municipal affairs" are analogous to the problems
encountered under National League of Cities v. Usery in defining "integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions." See infra note 182. The purpose of this analysis is not
to argue that the municipal affairs doctrine is helpful to define the power of city governments.
Rather, if something is viewed as a municipal affair for purposes of state law, a court doing a
federal preemption analysis may be aided by the doctrine in determining whether a matter is
local and entitled to a presumption.
The concept of municipal affairs has a protective function and an authority granting func-
tion. The protective function permits cities to legislate without fear of state legislative interfer-
ence. The authority granting function merely permits cities to act within the sphere of
municipal affairs unless restricted by its charter or the state's constitution. The extent to
which the two functions overlap has varied over time. Sato, supra, at 1060-75. The California
Constitution provides that "[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." CAL,
CONST. art. XI, § 7 (until a 1970 amendment which slightly altered the wording, this provision
was found at article XI, section 11). Sato argues that the police power provision does not serve
a protective function. Sato, supra, at 1094-98. Nonetheless, this provision, as an authority
granting provision, arguably establishes the principal that police power is traditionally a local
power. See also supra note 83.
Sato recommends three standards to determine whether an activity is a protected munici-
pal affair. First, state laws should prevail where they are directed at the externalities of muni-
cipal activity. Second, state laws should prevail where applied to the public and private sector.
Finally, "[m]atters of intracorporate structure and process designed to make an institution
function effectively, responsively, and responsibly should generally be deemed a municipal af-
fair." Sato, supra, at 1075-78. Most California cases dealing with this third category have held
that such activity involves municipal affairs. See, e.g., Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205
Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928) (method of enacting an ordinance); Lawlor v. Williamson, 135 Cal.
415, 67 P. 504 (1902) (establishment of a city board of health); Wiley v. City of Berkeley, 136
Cal. App. 2d 10, 288 P.2d 123 (1955) (park abandonment procedure). Sato contends that
"[m]ost matters that fall within this category should be considered municipal affairs." Sato,
supra, at 1081. Most of the provisions of the Los Angeles resolution fall under this third
category of protected affairs. For example, establishing a board to study immigration and a
policy of rendering city services without inquiring into citizenship status concern procedures
affecting the responsiveness of the city to its residents. Therefore a presumption in favor of at
least these provisions should be established. For an overview of the issues involved in home
rule, see D. MANDELKER, D. NETSCH & P. SALSICH, JR., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 79-152 (1983).
The issue of preemption may also arise as to state law versus city ordinances. For a recent
formulation of the California state preemption rules, see Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 40
Cal. 3d 277, 284, 707 P.2d 840, 847, 219 Cal. Rptr. 467, 474 (1985). This Comment considers
the sanctuary resolutions only in terms of federal preemption.
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whether local taxes have been paid before quelling a conflagration. 135
Likewise, a city determines how witnesses to local crimes should be
treated, including inquiry into citizenship, because such procedures re-
late to local law and order. Consequently, when examined, noncoopera-
tion provisions simply define the manner in which a city will conduct its
municipal affairs.
Viewed in isolation, the sanctuary resolutions operate to dissemi-
nate city services and to inform the federal government of desired
changes in refugee policy.
B. Sanctuary Resolutions: Encroachment on an Exclusive Federal
Power or an Occupied Field?
Two possible grounds for preempting city sanctuary resolutions are
that they constitute an exercise of power exclusively reserved to the fed-
eral government and that they touch upon a field occupied by the federal
government. In either case, consideration must be given to the specific
provisions of the resolutions and how they operate.136
1. Exclusive federal power and the sanctuary resolutions
The argument that an exclusive federal power preempts sanctuary
resolutions begins with a consideration of federal power. Several consti-
tutional provisions support the conclusion that exclusive federal power
exists in the field of immigration and foreign affairs. First, the Constitu-
tion expressly provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization." '137 Court decisions also recognize
the plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration.1 38 Second, the
135. Farley, 67 Cal. 2d at 331-32, 431 P.2d at 654-55, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31 (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
136. NOWAK, supra note 55, at 293 ("IThe Court must consider the federal law and its
operation compared with the state statute and its operation. Then, the decision is based upon
the specifics of the relationship between the relevant statutory provisions within the preemp-
tion framework."); see also supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Several other provisions of the Constitution explicitly
grant foreign affairs powers to Congress. Article I grants Congress power "[t]o define and
punish... Offences against the Law of Nations," "[t]o declare War," "[tlo raise and support
Armies" and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy." Id. § 8, cls. 10-13.
138. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is
over' the admission of aliens.") (citation omitted); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70
(1972) ("plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has
long been firmly established"). For a critical discussion of the rationales supporting the
Court's view that legislative and executive power to exclude aliens is absolute and unreview-
able, see Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957
(1982); Special Project, supra note 132, at 1314-22.
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commerce clause provides Congress with the power to regulate foreign
commerce. 139 Finally, several provisions of the Constitution' 40 support
the inference that the President of the United States is to be "the sole
organ" of the nation in matters concerning foreign affairs.141 Common
sense also suggests that matters of national concern ought to be deter-
mined by the national government and not by the states individually. 142
In De Canas v. Bica, 14 3 the Court addressed several of these con-
cerns in the context of the following California statute: "No employer
shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in
the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on
lawful resident workers." 1" The Court rejected the argument that for-
eign affairs concerns coupled with the constitutionally delineated con-
gressional power to regulate immigration and naturalization preempted
the state statute. The Court acknowledged that the "[p]ower to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."' 45 How-
ever, the Court noted that not every state action that deals in some way
with aliens is a "regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by
this constitutional power, whether latent dr exercised."' 46 The Court de-
fined a regulation of immigration to be "essentially a determination of
who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the condi-
139. The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court has recently recognized the
source of the federal government's power to regulate immigration to include its power over
foreign commerce, its power to establish a system of naturalization and its power over foreign
affairs. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
140. The Constitution designates the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States" and grants him power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors
"with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2. The Presi-
dent may also receive ambassadors. Id. § 3. These powers premise inferences that presidential
power extends beyond that expressly granted in the Constitution. See United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942) (executive agreements); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)
(executive agreements).
141. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). This often
quoted phrase cannot be accepted uncritically:
The statement in ... Curtiss- Wright ... that the President is "the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations" is not to the contrary. It
asserts that the President is the sole executor of American international policy, but
does not deal with the question of which branch is to make that policy.
The "Yale Paper".-Indochina: The Constitutional Crisis-Part III, reprinted in 116 CONG.
Rnc. 516, 480 n.13 (1970).
142. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
143. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
144. Id. at 352.
145. Id. at 354.
146. Id. at 355.
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tions under which a legal entrant may remain."147 This definition im-
plies that not all state regulation of aliens is "ipso facto regulation of
immigration.""14 Partly because the California statute concerned a local
matter-an attempt to strengthen the state's economy and to regulate the
employment relationship-the Court concluded that the statute did not
regulate immigration.149 Despite any indirect impact the statute might
have on immigration, the exclusive power of the federal government to
regulate immigration did not preempt the state statute.150
Under De Canas, whether this exclusive federal power preempts the
city sanctuary resolutions depends on whether the resolutions can be
characterized as regulations of immigration. While the De Canas Court
concluded that the California statute at issue did not constitute a regula-
tion of immigration, the Court151 cited Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com-
mission. 152 The statute in Takahashi that excluded Japanese aliens from
fishing off California shores added a condition to admission by barring
them from an occupation. 5 This state restriction on Japanese aliens,
therefore, was preempted by the exclusive power of the federal govern-
ment to regulate immigration. 54
Sanctuary resolution provisions characterized as strictly local do not
constitute regulations of immigration. First, commendation provisions
do not infringe upon an exclusive federal power. Provisions commending
groups who work in the sanctuary movement and groups providing hu-
manitarian relief to refugees cannot be reasonably characterized as regu-
lations of immigration. Statements of commendation are merely
statements of commendation. Whether these statements operate to frus-
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 355-56.
150. Id. at 356.
151. Id. at 355.
152. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). In Takahashi, the Court articulated two rationales for invalidat-
ing the state statute. The decision confusingly rests on equal protection and federal preemp-
tion grounds. Id. at 418-20, 422. Truax v. Raich, also decided on equal protection and federal
preemption grounds, invalidated an Arizona restriction on employment opportunities for
aliens. 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915). Similarly, Graham v. Richardson invalidated stringent state
imposed requirements on alien access to state welfare on equal protection and federal preemp-
tion grounds. 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971). Because of inconsistencies in the Court's equal
protection analysis, some commentators have recommended that courts rely solely on preemp-
tion analysis when considering state discrimination against aliens. Perry, Modern Equal Pro-
tection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLuM. L. Ruv. 1023, 1060-65 (1979). In Toll
v. Moreno, a Maryland University policy of denying domicile to nonimmigrant aliens holding
visas issued to employees of certain international organizations and their family members for
purposes of lower tuition was invalidated solely on preemption grounds. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
153. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 415-22.
154. Id.
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trate achievement of federal policy relates to whether the federal govern-
ment has occupied the field or whether a conflict exists with federal law.
Analytically, only the naked federal power is relevant to the preemptive
force of an exclusive power. While the sanctuary movement makes a
statement as to what refugee policy should be, criticizes current policy
and works inside and outside of the law,15 commendation of groups in-
volved in the movement does not determine who may be admitted to the
country and under what conditions they may remain.
Commendation provisions are more analogous to the statutory pro-
visions at issue in De Canas than those at issue in Takahashi. In De
Canas, the Court focused on the local nature of the employment relation-
ship addressed by the statute. Similarly, sanctuary resolutions recognize
groups whose activities are local. Further, the very activity of recogniz-
ing groups is an activity whose nature is local regardless of its subject.
For instance, a city can recognize its residents who serve the country
during war. While the subject of the commendation is not local in the
sense that it relates to foreign affairs, the very function of commendation
is not viewed as related to foreign affairs. To impute the activities of a
person or group commended by the city to the city proves too much. In
Takahashi, on the other hand, legally present aliens were excluded from
pursuing an occupation. Commendation provisions of the sanctuary res-
olutions neither add nor subtract from the conditions of residence. In-
stead, commendations recognize those providing services to aliens.
Statements of noncooperation do not impinge on an exclusive fed-
eral power. Excluding refugee status from consideration in rendering
city services should not be viewed as a regulation of immigration. Like
the state's concern in De Canas, the city's concern is local: procedures
for providing city services. The city may base such a decision on purely
local concerns. For instance, Los Angeles has a substantial Latino popu-
lation. 56 The city council could decide that inquiring into the refugee
status of dark skinned people damages the atmosphere of the city; 5 7 that
the physical health of the city as a whole may be jeopardized when signif-
icant portions of the city do not receive city services that address medical
needs and health conditions; and that it is good to have violations of
housing codes reported by all tenants of the city to assure general compli-
ance with the codes."' No doubt the dominant reason Los Angeles
155. See supra note 4.
156. An estimated 300,000 immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala reside in Los An-
geles. Council Votes, supra note 22, at 1, col. 1.
157. See Appendix C, cl. 5.
158. Council Votes, supra note 22, at 1, col. 2 ("Woo said the resolution would remove the
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passed its sanctuary resolution was to make a political statement, but
making a statement does not impinge upon an exclusive federal power.
Likewise, restricting local police participation in INS raids and in-
vestigations does not amount to a regulation of immigration. 15 9 Support-
ing a police department policy16° of not notifying the INS when refugees
are arrested for minor violations and of refusing to inquire into the refu-
gee status of people who witness crimes does not amount to a regulation
of immigration. At one level, people may dispute the wisdom of not re-
quiring local law enforcement agencies to inquire into refugee status.
That policy decision, however, merely relates to an internal procedure
followed by an arm of local government. It is no more an encroachment
on an exclusive federal power if police departments make inquiries and
referrals than if they do not. Arguably, however, making inquiries and
referrals absent congressional authorization constitutes an exercise of
power and, therefore, anything other than a policy of not inquiring and
making referrals would encroach on federal power. At another level,
where the city council only commends police department policy rather
than establishes that policy, the preemption claim should be directed at
the police department, if anyone, and not the city council. Finally, these
provisions merely withdraw city agencies from the federal fields to per-
mit the federal government to exercise its exclusive power exclusively.
1 61
Policy statement provisions similarly do not impinge upon an exclu-
sive federal power. Statements calling for federal legislative action,
whether clarification of the Refugee Act, 162 support of extended volun-
tary departure for Salvadorans 163 or more federal aid to local govern-
ments for resettlement costs,164 do not constitute regulations of
immigration. Cities have traditionally lobbied on the federal level for
various laws and programs that would advance the interests of the city.
Cities prepare legislative packets seeking federal legislation on various
issues. The existence of an exclusive federal power should not operate to
preempt the power of the state to request changes in federal policy. The
'climate of fear' that pervades the refugee community and encourage refugees to report crimes
when they are victims or turn in landlords for building code violations if they are forced to live
in substandard conditions.").
159. Appendix A, cl. 10; Appendix B, cl. 11.
160. Appendix C, cl. 11.
161. While city councils may intend to express disdain for federal policy, whether noncoop-
eration frustrates INS policy or the aims of the INA relates to whether the resolution conflicts
with federal policy. The present analysis considers whether the mere existence of the federal
power preempts the city resolutions.
162. Appendix C, cl. 12.
163. Appendix C, cl. 8.
164. Appendix C, cl. 13.
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right of states and cities to lobby or pass resolutions supporting otherwise
legal legislation should be absolute.65 This does not mean that the fed-
165. In Farley v. Healey, the California Supreme Court held that San Francisco initiatives
may be used to poll public opinion on nonmunicipal affairs. The court recognized that city
councils had even more leeway as to resolutions. 67 Cal. 2d 325, 328, 431 P.2d 650, 652-53, 62
Cal. Rptr. 26, 28-29 (1967). Many commentators seem to imply that the federal government
may not prohibit cities from passing nonbinding resolutions concerning federal policy or from
lobbying the federal government. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 45, 306 (1983)
(excerpts from a manuscript of this book were published in Yudof, When Governments Speak-
Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863
(1979)); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 589 n.124, 592-93, 603-04
(1980). If the federal government may not prohibit the sanctuary resolutions, the protection
afforded cities would be better premised on the narrow federalism grounds proposed, infra
note 182, than on free speech grounds. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech . .. ."). Federal intrusion on city authority is better
understood in terms of federalism. YUDOF, supra, at 45 & n.32. Further, commentators have
only begun to systematically evaluate the influence of government speech on first amendment
values and first amendment theory. See generally Shiffrin, supra; YUDOF supra. Development
of a principled basis for distinguishing between government speech that will and will not be
protected is beyond the scope of this Comment. The following discussion raises some issues
relevant to premising protection of the sanctuary resolutions on the free speech clause.
First, the sanctuary resolutions would be protected speech if they are characterized as
expressions of private individuals rather than expressions of city governments. Acceptance of
public office does not terminate an individual's right to speak. See supra note 127; YUDOF,
supra, at 172, 261. While certain restrictions may be imposed on the participation of govern-
ment employees in political management and political campaigns, restrictions may not be im-
posed on the policy statements of a legislator. Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947) (sustaining section nine of the Hatch Act); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (sustaining section nine of the Hatch
Act against overbreadth challenge); and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (sus-
taining state counterpart to the Hatch Act against overbreadth challenge) with Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (legislator cannot be denied a seat in the state legislature because of
public statements since the "First Amendment... requires that legislators be given the widest
latitude to express their views on issues of policy"); Eller Outdoor Advertising v. Board of
Supervisors, 89 Cal. App. 3d 76, 80, 152 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (Bond requires strict construction
of city charter to permit passage of resolutions). Lobbying and nonbinding resolutions may
constitute protected private speech. Arguing against the extension of free speech to local gov-
ernment, Yudof observes:
Legislators may also view lobbying by municipal officials and employees as fall-
ing closer to the private rights of officials to express themselves than to official gov-
ernment communication. And this may be the strongest argument against
constitutionalizing a right of government expression, even at a local level. Public
officials remain free to express themselves; their views carry considerable weight in
the political process. Generally, they will have access to the mass media simply be-
cause their opinions are news. So long as the First Amendment rights of such offi-
cials are preserved, the point of view of those who perceive a particular political
outcome as most desirable for the municipality will be expressed, and the people will
be informed about the policies under consideration of the electorate. It is simply not
necessary to accept the dangerous and unprincipled position that local governments
are constitutionally entitled, despite contrary state laws, to allocate large sums of
public money to advertising campaigns in order to vindicate the interests of citizens
in receiving information and in being informed.
YUDOF, supra, at 49-50. In contexts other than lobbying and nonbinding resolutions it would
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eral power to regulate immigration is not exclusive. It means that the
be difficult to disentangle unprotected government speech from the protected "private utter-
ances of government officials." YUDOF, supra, at 13.
If nonbinding resolutions like the sanctuary resolutions constitute private utterances of
city officials, the free speech clause would protect such speech from repression by the federal
government. The government could prohibit the speech only if it could satisfy one of the
several tests designed to separate permissible from impermissible government regulation.
First, the federal government could restrain the expressions embodied in the sanctuary resolu-
tions if it could establish that the advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969). Since subscribing during the Vietnam War to the statement "'we are in
sympathy with and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to military
draft'" could not alone "be interpreted as a call to unlawful refusal to be drafted," statements
in city resolutions commending humanitarian work by organizations providing sanctuary, pro-
viding for noncooperation, supporting pending congressional bills and declaring the city a
sanctuary cannot alone be interpreted as a call to unlawful refusal to abide by immigration
law. Bond, 385 U.S. at 133. If a court found that the incitement test was met, it would not be
the first time that a spurious argument coupled with hysteria threatened free speech. See Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Kalven, Ernest Freund and the First Amendment Tradi-
tion, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 235, 237 (1973) ("To put [Debs] in modern context, it is somewhat as
though George McGovern had been sent to prison for his criticism of the war."). Under the
content neutrality standard of Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the federal
government could not prohibit city councils from only passing resolutions dealing with immi-
gration law or from passing resolutions contrary to the President's view of immigration law.
See id. at 99 ("In this case, the ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing not in terms
of time, place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter. The regulation 'thus slip[s] from
the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.' This is never
permitted.") (footnote omitted). Since the sanctuary resolutions constitute symbolic expres-
sion, any federal restriction must satisfy the following requirements: the regulation must be
within the constitutional power of the government; it must further a substantial government
interest; it must be unrelated to the suppression of ideas; and the incidental restriction on
speech must be no greater than necessary to further that interest. United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). At the very least, the federal government would be hard pressed to
establish that any regulation which prohibited sanctuary resolutionsfurthered or advanced the
government's interest. See infra, notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
If sanctuary resolutions cannot be characterized as private speech for purposes of the first
amendment, does the free speech clause protect the resolutions as government speech? Yudof
analyzes the arguments for and against the extension of first amendment protection to govern-
ment expression. YUDOF, supra, at 42-50. He ultimately rejects the notion of protected gov-
ernment speech. He also rejects the judicial review model by which courts impose direct limits
on governmental expressions and the model which views government speech as an additional
factor to be considered when vindicating traditional private rights. YUDOF, supra, at 301.
Shiffrin, on the other hand, abstains from systematic consideration of the constitutional rights
to free expression held by government officials or entities and seems to adopt the model re-
jected by Yudof for combating government speech which threatens first amendment values.
Shriffin, supra, at 572 n.31, 605-12.
Yudof adopts what he calls a "legislative remand" model of judicial review. YUDOF,
supra, at 301. Under this model courts would resolve claims of abuse of government speech
by determining whether the legislature had explicitly authorized the entity in question to make
such communications in the manner at issue. Absent explicit authorization, the communica-
tion would be ultra vires and invalidated as a matter of statutory construction. The legislature
could subsequently extend authority to such communication in the future. Whether or not the
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power to petition for otherwise legal federal action does not overlap or
strict test of statutory authorization would be applied to a particular government expression
would hinge on preliminary evaluation of the following five factors: government communica-
tion during the pendency of elections; speech involving more than isolated governmental in-
volvement in partisan campaigns; specific sums of monies to the communications activity; one-
sided messages aimed at influencing the issues; and expenditures used for mailing and advertis-
ing campaigns directed explicitly to the voters rather than local government lobbying of the
state legislature. YUDOF, supra, at 305.
The sanctuary resolutions under Yudof's model should not be susceptible to a claim of
abusive governmental speech. First, the factors Yudof recommends suggest that the strict
authorization test should not apply. Cities have not allocated specific sums of money to
achieve the ends of the sanctuary resolutions because the resolutions are ends in themselves.
The only expenditures associated with the resolutions are council members' time, the overhead
costs, ink and paper that go into passage of any resolution upon which the city cannot legislate.
While a de minimus standard may prove difficult to apply at the margins, it dictates that the
sanctuary resolutions not be subject to the strict authorization test. See supra note 127;
YUDOF, supra, at 235. Even if a judge concluded that the factors supported application of the
strict authorization test, authorization may be found in state statutes. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 40 § 5(15) (West 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 3 § 50 (West Supp. 1986). If
no authorization was found, the legislature could amend the state constitution or charter cities
could amend their charters to authorize adoption of nonbinding resolutions and adopt another
sanctuary resolution. A city would not gain any added protection against federal preemption
because the first amendment is reduced to a question of statutory construction under this
model.
If a court finds that a state and its subdivisions have rights of expression that cannot be
infringed upon by the federal government, federal law would not be able to preempt the sanc-
tuary resolutions. If the resolutions are characterized as municipal speech the resolutions be-
come insulated from the preemptive force of federal law and federal power. Only if the federal
government can overcome the more rigorous protections of the first amendment would it be
able to preempt the sanctuary resolutions. Yudof's discussion of a rights approach to govern-
ment speech focuses on competing claims between federal governmental entities or between
state governmental entities. In discussing the rights approach and municipalities, Yudof states
that "the constitutional question is whether a state law, as interpreted by the judiciary of that
state, is unconstitutional if it forbids municipalities from devoting local or state resources to
some or all public relations and advertising activities." YtjoF, supra, at 48. A positivistic
approach to the rights of cities to speak recognizes cities as creatures of the state. Note, The
Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 535, 536 (1980). With city sanctuary resolutions the issue is not whether the city may
claim speech rights independent of what the state confers, but whether the federal government
may silence the cities. Although he rejects a rights approach, Yudof recognizes that "[a]
stronger case perhaps occurs ... if the federal government were to forbid states or localgovern-
ments from engaging in certain activities in relation to federal programs or policy debates."
YUDOF, supra, at 45. With the demise of National League of Cities, how would Yudof best
deal with this question? See id. at 45 & n.32; see also infra note 182. Although unwilling to
extend free speech protections to local government, Yudof notes:
Perhaps a stronger case can be made for local governments. Local governments,
indisputably, are generally much less menacing communicators than the vast federal
agencies in Washington. Their voters would be only a few among many, and the
probability of their drowning out other centers of communication slight. Almost
invariably, they raise a large proportion of their revenues from local taxes, and they
often have wide-ranging powers under home-rule charters and similar statutory de-
vices. The argument would be that they have strong independent stakes in legislative
decisions and voter approval or disapproval of state constitutional amendments,
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touch the federal power. While city regulations that determine grounds
for admissions and conditions for continued residence are preempted by
the federal power, political activity by cities that support or urge changes
in federal regulations adopted pursuant to that power is not preempted.
The field of exclusive federal power extends to cover conditions of en-
trance, formal or informal, not statements of what those conditions
should be.
Finally, the symbolic expression provisions do not impinge upon an
exclusive federal power. Declaring a city to be a city of sanctuary consti-
tutes a nonissue issue. An issue exists in the sense that people can debate
the wisdom of establishing their city as a place of sanctuary. No issue
exists with respect to whether federal power preempts the declaration.
Constitutionally, what is significant about declaring a city to be a sanctu-
ary? In a narrow sense, it means the city affirms the ideals of the Refugee
Act-that people who flee their homeland for fear of political persecu-
tion should not be returned to face death. In this narrow sense, a city
resolution creating a city of sanctuary does not determine anything. It
only makes a statement of values that claims to coincide with a congres-
sional enactment. It leaves to the executive branch the task of executing
federal policy. Hence, no encroachment on an exclusive federal power
exists.
In a broader sense, a "City of Sanctuary" stands for bitter disap-
pointment in executive enforcement of congressional policy. It condones
the actions of others who have responded to this perceived subversion of
congressional policy by supporting legislation, transporting illegal aliens
who claim to satisfy the requirements of the Refugee Act and hiding
illegal aliens from the INS. Even this show of support does not amount
bond issues, and referenda. In such circumstances, it is natural for local govern-
ments to seek to influence such decisions, including resorting to legislative lobbying
or to public advertising to persuade or inform their own constituents-and perhaps
those in other areas of the state--of the most advantageous outcome of the political
processes for the local government and its citizens. Indeed, many states specifically
allow lobbying activities by local governments.
YUDOF, supra, at 48.
While recognizing a general rights approach to government expression may be fraught
with peril, these perils are avoided where rights of expression granted to cities by states or by
city charter are protected against federal silencing as a matter of first amendment law. The
federal government would be hard pressed to overcome the protection accorded the sanctuary
resolutions by the first amendment under such a view. Even if one accepts that the incitement
test should be relaxed where government speech is concerned, the sanctuary resolutions would
not be objectionable. Id. at 260-61. Certainly the issues addressed in the sanctuary resolutions
involve part of the "debate on public issues [that] should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
spread ... that ... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1965).
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to a regulation of immigration unless the acts of those supported are im-
puted to the city. The city has merely made a symbolic gesture. The
city's only action is the declaration free of any act of regulation.
Although individual clauses may not constitute regulations of immi-
gration, when viewed together as clauses within a sanctuary resolution
they may encroach upon federal domain. Some opponents of the sanctu-
ary resolutions claim that, viewed in their entirety, the resolutions
amount to city councils establishing their own foreign policy. 166 The Los
Angeles resolution does not attempt to establish city foreign policy. The
Los Angeles resolution urges city employees not to violate federal law
and states that the federal government is responsible for immigration
law. 167 The resolution does not recognize another government in El Sal-
vador as the country's legitimate government. The resolution does not
create the Los Angeles Immigration and Naturalization Service. Instead,
the resolution requests an annual report from the Human Relations
Commission to assess the situation of immigrants located in Los Ange-
les. 168 Courts have viewed the establishment of similar boards as a
municipal affair. 169 The resolution reflects a discontent with execution of
congressional policy, not a change in policy or the enactment of a regula-
tion of immigration. These resolutions constitute largely symbolic
gestures of a nonbinding character, 170 rather than regulations of immi-
gration or development of foreign policy. An exclusive power implies the
presence of power; a nonbinding resolution implies a lack of power; that
an exclusive power would operate to preempt a nonbinding resolution
defies logic.'71
2. Occupation of the field and the sanctuary resolutions
If a court decides that Congress intended to occupy the field in
which the sanctuary resolutions operate, the resolutions would be pre-
empted even in the absence of a conflict. Where Congress makes an ex-
press statement in a statute that state law in a defined field is preempted,
the case is easy. 172 However, in the field of immigration, Congress has
not made such an expression about matters addressed in the sanctuary
166. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
167. Appendix C, cl. 10.
168. Appendix C, cl. 14.
169. See supra note 134.
170. L.A. Council Backs Down, supra note 26, at 26, col. 2.
171. Alas, the spirit of Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing finds embodiment in those
who find constitutional offense in the sanctuary resolutions and those like myself who choose
to write about the resolutions.
172. See supra note 64.
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resolutions. Courts must examine other tests to determine whether Con-
gress has occupied the field. First, a court should examine the INA and
its legislative history to determine whether it supports an inference that
Congress intended to preempt the sanctuary resolutions. Secondly, a
court should consider three objective factors to determine whether con-
gressional action preempts the sanctuary resolutions: the pervasiveness
of federal regulations; the dominance of the federal interest; and the risk
of conflicting administration. 173 In reaching a conclusion, a court should
also consider the characterization of the state and federal interests.
174
a. the INA as a basis to infer occupation of the field
The INA does not support an inference that Congress intended to
occupy the field in which the sanctuary resolutions operate. In De Canas
v. Bica, the Court observed that there is no presumption that because
Congress passed the INA it intended to preempt state power to regulate
the employment relationship. 175 The mere comprehensiveness of the
INA did not suffice to preempt the California law. 176 Since the subject
matter regulated by the INA is complex, comprehensive legislation is a
natural offspring without regard to preemptive intent.17 7 The "central
concern" of the INA is the "terms and conditions of admission to the
country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the
country." 178
173. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. When the Court considers these "objec-
tive factors" it appears to be balancing federal and state interests. NOWAK, supra note 55, at
293.
174. See supra notes 83-84, 94-135 and accompanying text.
175. 424 U.S. at 357. In De Canas, the Court held that Congress did not occupy the field
embraced by a California statute penalizing employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens to
the detriment of lawful resident workers. Id. at 356. The Court began by finding that the
California statute addressed a local concern. The Court characterized this statute as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power regulating the employment relationship. Id. at 356-57. Be-
cause employment of illegal aliens (1) deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs in
times of high unemployment, (2) may tend to depress wages, and (3) may limit the effective-
ness of unions, the statute addressed a local problem. Id. at 356-57. The fact that California
borders Mexico strengthened the claim that the statute addressed peculiarly local problems.
Id. at 357. Despite the characterization of the problem as local, the Court considered whether
Congress intended to occupy the field because even state regulation designed to protect vital
state interests must give way to paramount federal legislation. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 359-60.
178. Id. at 359. The Court seemingly identified the "central concern" of the INA with its
definition of a regulation of immigration. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Thus,
courts must examine specific provisions of the INA to determine the preemptive intent of
Congress. In De Canas, the Court did just that. It reasoned that the proviso to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324, excluding employment from the definition of harboring an illegal alien, did not support
an inference of congressional intent to preempt the state law. 424 U.S. at 360 & n.9. Further,
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The California statute in De Canas and the sanctuary resolutions
contain certain similarities and differences. In De Canas, the Court ele-
vated the state interest by viewing the statute as a strictly local regulation
of the employment relationship. 79 This characterization created a pre-
sumption in favor of the state statute. Despite the federal power to regu-
late immigration and congressional enactment of statutes, the Court
maintained a restrictive view of the federal interest. Provisions of the
sanctuary resolutions should be accorded a similar presumption in favor
of city interests.180 The presumption favoring several provisions in the
sanctuary resolutions should be stronger than the presumption favoring
the California statute in De Canas. While Congress could likely regulate
the local employment relationship at issue in De Canas,181 Congress
could not prohibit cities from supporting changes in federal policy or
from commending organizations working in the community. 82
other federal law that criminalizes knowing employment of illegal aliens "sanctions" state laws
criminalizing the same conduct. Id. at 360 n.9, 361-62. These two facts supported the infer-
ence that "Congress believes this problem [did] not yet require uniform national rules and is
appropriately addressed by the States as a local matter." Id. at 360 n.9.
179. 424 U.S. at 356-57.
180. See generally supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
181. This conclusion seems implied in the Court's discussion. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360
n.9.
182. Even if Congress desired to preempt the sanctuary resolutions, the tenth amendment
may preclude such federal action. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. As a limit on the congres-
sional power to regulate commerce, two basic approaches to the tenth amendment compete for
preeminance. Under one approach, the judiciary carves out a field of state activity immune
from the reach of the federal government. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (relying on the tenth amendment and principles of federalism to invalidate the exten-
sion of the Fair Labor Standard Acts (FLSA) to nearly all state and municipal employees),
overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). The other
approach claims that "the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participa-
tion in federal governmental action" limits the federal power over interstate commerce. Gar-
cia, 105 S. Ct. at 1009 (upholding the extension of the FLSA to a municipally owned and
operated mass transit system). The judiciary's only role under this latter approach "must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred
province of state autonomy.'" Id. at 10 19-20 (citation omitted).
Either of these approaches may protect the sanctuary resolutions, in whole or in part,
from the reach of the federal government. Under Usery's sacred province approach, the sanc-
tuary resolutions concern matters immune from the reach of the federal government. Under
Garcia's process-oriented approach, since sanctuary resolutions largely constitute nonbinding
expressions of city councils, to repress such expressions would result in the exclusion of a
political subdivision of a state from the very process that defines the sphere of its authority.
These contentions based on competing tenth amendment theories must be situated in the con-
text of recent Supreme Court decisions.
Adopting the "sacred province" approach, the Usery Court held that Congress may not
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In De Canas, the Court restricted the field of federal interest for
several reasons. Most importantly, specific federal agricultural statutes
exercise its commerce power in a manner that "impermissably interfere[s] with the integral
governmental functions of these bodies." Usery, 426 U.S. at 851. While upholding a federal
regulatory scheme aimed at privately operated mines, the Supreme Court translated the princi-
ples of Usery into a four part test: first, the federal regulation must regulate the "States as
States;" secondly, "the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably 'attri-
bute[s] of state sovereignty;'" thirdly, "the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmen-
tal functions;'" and finally, the "federal interest advanced" must not be of such a nature as to
"justif[y] state submission." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 287-88, 288 n.29 (1981) (citations omitted; brackets in original). Several cases decided
after Hodel found that Usery did not insulate states from particular regulations of commerce.
See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (federal regulation of
labor management relations and state owned railroads); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n
(FERC) v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (federal laws requiring state agencies regulating
utilities to consider federally proposed rate standards according to federally prescribed proce-
dure); Equal Employment Opportunities Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (applica-
tion of federal age discrimination statute to bar mandatory retirement of state fish and game
wardens at age 55). In 1985, the Supreme Court overruled Usery. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at
1005.
The significance of Garcia, beyond its practical effect, is its fundamental break with the
role Usery assigned the judiciary in defining the boundaries of federalism. Garcia "commits to
Congress (or, if you like, to the 'constitutive processes' operative in restraint of Congress) the
power to decide how far the power to regulate commerce should extend." Van Alstyne, supra
note 24, at 1726. Although Garcia has supplanted Usery, attention must be given to both
because several judges are committed to reversing Garcia. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1033 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Skover, "Phoenix Rising"
and Federalism Analysis, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271 (1986) (describing a pattern whereby
one doctrine of federalism gains ascendancy only to be replaced by the previously supplanted
doctrine).
In Usery, the Court did not determine whether federalism concerns restricted congres-
sional powers other than the commerce clause. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. In a case upholding a
federal wage stabilization act adopted pursuant to the commerce clause, Justice Rehnquist
wrote that "Congress may well in time of declared war have extraordinary authority to regu-
late activities in the national interest which could not be reached by the commerce power" and
that it "may well be empowered under the legislative authority granted to it by the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution to impose significant restrictions on what
would otherwise be thought state prerogatives." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558-59
(1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In City of Rome v. United States the
Court expressly decided that "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to
congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War
Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.'" 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980). The Court distin-
guished Usery and the commerce power because these "[a]mendments were specifically
designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty." Id. In 1982,
the Court made clear that when a state accepts money from Congress subject to conditions, the
spending power confers the power to demand repayment from the state if it does not abide by
the conditions. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1983) (Title I Education Program).
The Court distinguished the limitations Usery imposed on the commerce power stating: "Re-
quiring states to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding
before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty." Id.
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at 790. Thus, "[i]f the conditions [are] valid, the State [has] no sovereign right to retain funds
without complying with those conditions." Id. at 791; see also supra note 24.
Although characterized as Congress' most complete power, a Court partial to Usery
should extend its principles to regulations of immigration. See supra note 138. The Usery
approach was not extended to the congressional enforcement powers under the Civil War
amendments because federalism was one of the barriers to achieving the goals of these amend-
ments. The restrictions were not extended to the spending power because states are free to
accept or reject federal funds and, therefore, voluntarily surrender their sovereignty to the
extent that their financier is the federal government. States are not immune from federal taxes
that do not discriminate between states or against states compared to others engaged in the
same activity. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (upholding a nondiscrimi-
natory federal registration tax on civil aircraft as applied to a state helicopter used by the
police); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (upholding a federal tax on mineral
water bottled by New York using essential/nonessential function test to define the scope of
state immunity); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (employees of state corporations
have no immunity from federal income tax on their salaries). Regulations of commerce and
regulations over immigration find force in the supremacy clause; state encroachment upon the
federal power is prevented by the preemption doctrine. Hence, the principles of Usery should
apply to both of these sources of federal power. Of course, their application may differ. The
limitations imposed by federalism concerns must not frustrate the purpose of the federal
power. While the principles of Usery may apply to the congressional power to regulate com-
merce and immigration, the actual limitations imposed on the power to regulate the latter may
differ somewhat from limitations imposed on the former.
For example, Van Alstyne suggests that the "rationale of Garcia [is] ample to sustain acts
of Congress well drawn to 'persuade' states to move their state capitols to their principal cen-
ters of commerce." Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1720 n.52. Some commentators think that
the wording of Garcia leaves room for the Court to invalidate such "horrible possibilities." See
Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided
Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 113 (1985). Similarly, a statute could be well drawn to per-
suade states to change the Spanish names of cities like Los Angeles, pursuant to the federal
power over immigration. It would be a modest expression of judicial power to invalidate such
a statute based on the principles of federalism. Could Congress require the state of California
to rename Refugio State Beach? Could Congress forbid renaming Los Angeles "La Ciudad de
Sanctuario"?
The principles of Usery dictate that Congress could not mandate that city dog catchers
detain refugees, prohibit cities from passing nonbinding resolutions commenting on federal
policy, or dictate that cities not provide their services without first inquiring into the citizen-
ship status of recipients. To do so would impair the ability of cities to structure integral opera-
tions in areas similar to those recognized in opinions supporting the Usery approach as
traditional governmental functions. See, e.g., Usery, 426 U.S. at 851. (Extension of FLSA
standards to public employees would "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to
structure employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation."). Under this approach, however, it is
arguable that Congress could require that local police departments inquire into the citizenship
status of criminals and inform the INS if they are illegal aliens. Such a requirement is some-
what analagous to the requirement that state courts adjudicate federal causes of action.
FERC, 456 U.S. at 760 (discussing Testa v. Katz, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
One factor precipitating the abandonment of Usery was the difficulty in identifying tradi-
tional governmental functions. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1011-12. Under Garcia, the political
process, not the judiciary defines the boundaries of federalism. The Court's only role is to
police the process. Arguably cities have a role in that process which includes passage of reso-
lutions determining which issues they will press congressional representatives to support. The
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sanctioned the coexistence of state penalties and federal penalties.' 8 3 The
burden imposed on illegal aliens and their employers by the California
statute was consistent with federal policy.18 4 Although federal statutes
do not sanction city sanctuary resolutions, the federal interest extends
only to the conditions of entry. The sanctuary resolutions do not alter or
supplement the conditions of entry.18 5 The INA, therefore, does not sup-
port an inference that Congress intended to occupy the field in which the
sanctuary resolutions operate.
The case of the sanctuary resolutions differs from the case of Hines
v. Davidowitz, where the Court held that a federal alien registration act
preempted a state alien registration act.186 In Hines, the Court began by
noting that "the supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and de-
portation, is made clear by the Constitution."'8 7 The federal government
is "entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of af-
fairs with foreign sovereignties" because it represents the "collective in-
terests" of the states.'
88
key is to define the process the Court is to police. If the process for cities constitutes only
lobbying congressional representatives, resolutions that do more than resolve a city's position
on an issue for purposes of lobbying would not be protected as part of the process. The only
provisions protected as part of the Garcia process would be those supporting pending bills and
urging changes in federal policy. See, e.g., Appendix C, cls. 8, 12, 13. Under a broader view of
political process, a view that recognizes direct representation and the freedom to persuade
constituents by advocacy, the Los Angeles resolution might be protected in whole from inter-
ference by the federal government.
183. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 361-62. In Toll v. Moreno, the Court described the holding in
De Canas narrowly because of the federal statutes generally authorizing the coexistence of
state penalties. Toll, 458 U.S. at 13 n.18. Enigmatically, the Court relied on the De Canas
analysis of prior precedent and the De Canas definition of a regulation of immigration. Id. at
11-14.
184. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357.
185. See supra notes 143-70 and accompanying text.
186. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941). The state act among other things, required every alien 18 years
of age or older to register annually, carry an identification card at all times and display it upon
demand to police officers. The statute authorized punishment of violators by fines of up to
$100 and/or imprisonment for up to 60 days for failure to register. The federal act, on the
other hand, included provisions for a single registration of aliens over 13 years of age and
fingerprinting but did not require aliens to carry and exhibit to police their registration cards.
Under the federal act, only willful failure to register was made a criminal offense punishable by
a fine of up to $1000 and/or imprisonment for up to six months. Id. at 59-61.
187. Id. at 62.
188. Id. at 63. The use of the language "full and exclusive" is problematic. See supra notes
77-82 and accompanying text. In Hines, the Court claimed that it did not decide the case on
the grounds of exclusive federal power but only on the grounds that Congress had occupied the
field. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62. Although an exclusive federal power supported the alien registra-
tion act, "[a]ny concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits."
Id. at 68. The difficulty is determining whether the state action should be characterized as an
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In the second part of the opinion,189 the Court held that the field in
which the Pennsylvania legislature acted had been occupied by Con-
gress.190 The Court recognized that "[flor many years Congress has pro-
vided a broad and comprehensive plan describing the terms and
conditions upon which aliens may enter this country." 191 Many treaties
had been intermittently enacted pledging not to discriminate against
aliens residing in the United States.192 The Court noted that the alien
registration act added to the already comprehensive scheme of immigra-
tion regulations.
193
The Court also considered the specific legislative history of the fed-
eral act. 194 Congress had considered many previous registration bills, re-
jecting provisions similar to provisions in the Pennsylvania statute. 195
The Court concluded that Congress intentionally integrated the registra-
tion act into the broader immigration and naturalization laws to form a
single cohesive scheme and purposefully decided to exclude the contro-
versial provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. 196 Based on the legislative
history and the national import established in the first part of the opin-
ion, the Court held that Congress intended to occupy the field.' 9 7
The federal interest and power considered in Hines is analogous to
the federal interest and power that arguably preempts the sanctuary reso-
lutions. In both instances the basis for the applicable federal law lies in
the constitutional provisions giving the federal government exclusive
powers over foreign affairs and naturalization. As the question of alien
registration may effect concerns touching upon foreign affairs, the ques-
tion of which refugees are to be admitted into this country under the
Refugee Act may also touch upon foreign affairs. In Hines, the Court
noted that treaties establishing reciprocal obligations between the United
States and other countries require that aliens from certain countries not
be singled out for burdensome restrictions. State laws establishing in-
dependent rules of registration risk imposing burdens on aliens, that vio-
exercise of the exclusive federal power. One commentator suggested that the effect of the first
section of the Hines opinion was to erect a "presumption in favor of the federal law's preemp-
tive capability" that supported the Court's conclusion that Congress had occupied the field.
Note, supra note 56, at 630.
189. Hines, 312 U.S. at 69-74.
190. Id. at 73-74.
191. Id. at 69.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 70.
194. Id. at 71-73.
195. Id. at 71.
196. Id. at 71, 73 & n.36.
197. Id. at 73-74.
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late treaties and thereby jeopardize the national government. 198
Refugee policy also has ramifications on the posture in which the
nation develops its foreign policy. The Refugee Act grants refugee status
to individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution. To admit
refugees from another country implies either that the government perse-
cutes its people or that the government cannot maintain an environment
free of persecution. By making these decisions, cities complicate presi-
dential negotiation with other countries. 199
The relation of Pennsylvania's alien registration act to the applicable
federal law and federal power differs dramatically from the relation of
the city sanctuary resolutions to the applicable federal law and federal
power. In both instances a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme ex-
ists, but the federal statute in Hines was in the specific field Pennsylvania
attempted to regulate.2° The federal government and Pennsylvania each
had a statute providing for alien registration. The provisions of the sanc-
tuary resolutions merely commend local groups, urge changes in federal
policy, set policy for rendering city services and symbolically declare the
city a sanctuary. Federal immigration statutes deal with conditions of
entry. For the resolutions to be analogous to the Pennsylvania statute,
cities would have to pass an ordinance establishing a city refugee law
setting out who may be granted refuge, the process for granting refugee
status and city immigration offices to process asylum applications. The
resolutions do not do so. Finally, the Pennsylvania statute had force and
effect. The Los Angeles resolution is not an ordinance-it is a nonbind-
ing resolution establishing city policy.20' Although analogous powers
support the Alien Registration Act in Hines and the Refugee Act, the
corresponding enactments differ dramatically with respect to scope, ef-
fect and operation.
b. consideration of objective factors
Sixteen years after Hines, the Court held in Pennsylvania v. Nel-
son 202 that the Smith Act's prohibition of knowing advocacy of violent
and forceful overthrow of the United States preempted the Pennsylvania
Sedition Act.2 03 The Court articulated three grounds for determining
198. Id. at 63.
199. See supra note 13.
200. The De Canas Court relied on this distinction. 424 U.S. at 362.
201. See supra note 170. The arguments made in the text accompanying note 170 also
apply where a federal statute or the President exercises his power over foreign affairs.
202. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
203. Id. at 509.
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that a state statute impinges upon a field occupied by federal law: the
pervasiveness of the federal regulations, the dominance of the federal in-
terest and the danger of conflict with the administration of the federal
program.
204
In Nelson, the Court first examined the federal act and determined
that the pervasiveness of the scheme of classifications, sanctions, defini-
tions and registration requirements supported the inference that no room
was left for supplemental state law.2 °5 Second, the Court concluded that
the dominance of the federal interest precluded enforcement of state laws
on the same subject. Sedition threatened the nation as a whole. To pro-
tect against internal subversion, Congress proscribed sedition against all
levels of government including state and local government.20 6 Finally,
the Court concluded that enforcement of state sedition acts presented a
serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program.
The Court particularly relied on the danger of conflicting state and fed-
eral adjudications as well as the possible emergence of different substan-
tive offenses.207
Significant differences in facts command the conclusion that the out-
come in Nelson not control the outcome of the analysis of the sanctuary
resolutions. First, while the mere pervasiveness of the federal scheme in
Nelson supported the inference that Congress occupied the field,208 the
Court has been reluctant to view the INA as the basis for such an infer-
ence.20 9 Further, while the state statute in Nelson could be characterized
as supplemental, the sanctuary resolutions are not supplemental. The
Pennsylvania statute provided another cause of action enforceable
against the same action sanctioned by the federal government. Conse-
quently, the state statute could be viewed as supplemental. The sanctu-
ary resolutions do not create a second immigration and naturalization
service. The resolutions do not address matters nor fill gaps not covered
by the INA. The sanctuary resolutions only decree how city services
should be rendered and how federal law should be changed.
Unlike the statute in Nelson, the sanctuary resolutions should not be
preempted on the basis that the dominance of the federal interest pre-
cludes enforcement of state laws on the same subject. First, the sanctu-
204. Id. at 502, 504-05. For a discussion of these factors, see supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text.
205. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 502-04.
206. Id. at 504-05.
207. Id. at 507-08.
208. Id. at 502-04.
209. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 359-60.
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ary resolutions are nonbinding2 1° -there is nothing to enforce. Second,
the sanctuary resolutions do not touch the subject of federal interest in
the same way that the state sedition act regulated the same subject the
federal statute regulated. The sanctuary resolutions address the subject of
federal interest in two distinct ways. First, the federal interest is touched
tangentially, if at all, by city direction of how to use its resources. Sec-
ond, the federal interest is touched only in the sense that the resolutions
address what federal policy should be.
The sanctuary resolutions do not create the type of danger of con-
flicting adjudication that concerned the Nelson Court. There, the Court's
concern focused on the possibility of differing adjudications under federal
and state laws." 1 To be analogous, a city would have to enact its own
refugee act and provide for asylum and deportation hearings. Under
such circumstances, the possibility of conflicting determinations would
exist. The spirit of the sanctuary resolutions clearly conflicts with the
execution of federal policy. However, this conflict exists at the level of
advocating a change in federal policy. The sanctuary resolutions simply
do not create a mechanism capable of generating conflicting resolutions
of disputes.
The local nature of the actions of the city councils should also mili-
tate against a finding that Congress has occupied the field.21 2 The federal
interest does not reach the field the sanctuary resolutions OCcupy. 213 In
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Commission (PG&E),21 4 the Court held that a California statute
conditioning construction of nuclear plants on findings by a state com-
mission that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal were avail-
able for nuclear waste was not preempted by federal laws occupying the
field.215 In PG&E, the Court emphasized the historically local nature of
state regulation of the economies of energy production.2"6 Analogously,
210. See supra note 170.
211. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 507-08.
212. See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
214. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
215. Id. at 216.
216. The holding of the Court hinged upon two crucial conclusions. First, the state had
"historic" authority over the "generation and sale of electricity." Id. at 194, 205-07, 212.
Second, while the federal government regulates atomic energy to ensure that nuclear power is
safe, the California law intended to ensure a reliable source of energy. Id at 205. Hence, both
safety and economic considerations attach to the nuclear waste issue: improper storage of
waste threatens health and environment and lack of long term storage could lead to reactor
shutdowns resulting in nuclear power being unpredictable and uneconomical. Id. at 196.
The Court also concluded that Congress had not occupied the field in which the Califor-
nia statute operated. First, the Court defined the field of federal concern to be safety, public
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the Court should emphasize the historically local nature of the provision
of services and policies addressed in the sanctuary resolutions.
The Court in PG&E balked at the opportunity to examine the mo-
tives of the legislature so that it could recharacterize the statute as a
safety regulation rather than an economic regulation. The Court con-
cluded that a nonsafety rationale supported the statute: the statute ad-
dressed economic problems, not radiation hazards.2 17 The Court refused
to reclassify the statute as a regulation of safety.21 The Court refrained
from becoming "embroiled in attempting to ascertain California's true
motive." Determining legislative motive is difficult because what moti-
vates one legislator to vote for a statute does not necessarily motivate
another. The responsibility is on Congress to determine whether power
reserved to the states by a federal statute has been abused.219
Some observers of the Los Angeles City Council claim that the
council voted for the resolution to influence foreign affairs. Others claim
that the resolution was adopted to address such local issues as law en-
forcement and the atmosphere of the city.2 20 The motives of the city
council should not be relevant to the inquiry. Just as discerning state
legislative motives entails difficulties, so does discerning the motives of
the city council.
Analysis of the objective factors reveals that the city sanctuary reso-
lutions do not impinge upon an area occupied by federal law or domi-
nated by federal interest. The federal interest and the local interest
intersect tangentially, if at all. The sanctuary resolutions do not operate
to implicate the objective factors in a way that has previously concerned
health, national security and licensing the use of nuclear materials. Id. at 207. Second, the
Court accepted the economic purpose of the California statute as the rationale for its enact-
ment and concluded that its operation did not infringe upon the field occupied by the federal
government. Id. at 216. The Court stated that "[w]hen the Federal Government completely
occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it has done here, the test of pre-emption
is whether the 'matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
Federal Act.'" Id. at 212-13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236
(1947)).
217. Id. at 213. The Court referred to various committee reports describing waste disposal
as a largely economic issue. Absent acceptable long-term storage nuclear power can become
costly and result in shutdowns. Id. at 213-14. The reports referred to by the Court explained
that the safety of waste disposal methods is to be determined by the federal government.
218. Id. at 214-16.
219. Id. at 216-17.
220. See supra notes 23 & 158 and accompanying text. Disagreement exists on the method
and usefulness of attempts to discern legislative motive, particularly when interpreting the
Constitution. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Gorden, Critical Legal Histories,
36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
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the Court. Precisely because of the uniquely local nature of the actions
of the sanctuary resolutions, courts should not feel compelled to vindi-
cate the federal interest.
C. Sanctuary Resolutions: A Conflict with Federal Law?
The city sanctuary resolutions do not create a constitutionally rele-
vant conflict with federal law.221 Based on the available data, these reso-
lutions also do not frustrate federal policy. The policy provisions do not
contest the power of the federal government in the field of immigration
and refugee law. The Los Angeles resolution expressly states that the
field of immigration is properly reserved to the federal government and
advises all employees to comply with federal law.222 Admittedly, the
city's aim is to influence federal policy but this is not tantamount to sub-
stituting city policy for federal policy.
The noncooperation provisions likewise do not conflict with federal
law. These provisions do not frustrate federal policy because the fields in
which each operates do not intersect in a constitutionally recognizable
manner. The city exercises its control over city services while the federal
government exercises control over immigration. None of the noncooper-
ation provisions immunize illegal aliens from arrest or deportation.223
INS officers will not be arrested by city officials for enforcing federal law.
While the provisions may manifest displeasure with the formulation and
execution of federal policy, the Los Angeles resolution explicitly admon-
ishes city employees not to violate federal law.224 The federal govern-
221. To the extent that the rules of conflict and occupation overlap, arguments from the
previous section will not be repeated. See supra note 85. For example, the third objective
factor from Hines concerns conflicting adjudications as an indicator of congressional intent to
occupy a field. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. Such analysis applies to the con-
flict analysis as well.
222. Appendix C, cl. 10.
223. The author of the Los Angeles resolution, Michael Woo, wrote:
The resolution does not open up Los Angeles to a flood of immigrants; it specifically
applies to political refugees, not economic refugees seeking jobs-just as the Refugee
Act itself states. And it does not provide immunity from the law. In fact, it reaffirms
existing Los Angeles Police Department policy to detain and turn over to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, undocumented aliens who have been booked for
criminal activity.
City of Refuge, supra note 129, at 5, col. 3.
224. Appendix C, cl. 10.
The resolution also states quite clearly that immigration policy is a federal matter. It
admonishes city employees to comply with federal law while continuing to deliver
vital city services to people regardless of their legal status. The resolution specifically
states that it does not encourage city employees to violate the law or to interfere with
federal enforcement,
City of Refuge, supra note 129, at 5, col. 2. The West Hollywood resolution "direct[s] city
departments and employees not to assist in investigation or arrest of Salvadoran, Guatemalan
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ment has power over immigration, including enforcement of regulations,
not city governments. The INA does not specifically require cities and
local law enforcement agencies to operate as subdivisions of the INS or
to follow particular procedures when investigating crimes.225  A city
council may decide, because of limited resources or any other reason it
finds compelling, to withdraw from the field and let the INS do its own
work.226 The presumption should be in favor of cities retaining the au-
thority to allocate their own law enforcement resources and to establish
their own policies because this authority is local in nature and best char-
acterized as a municipal affair. 227 Thus, providing city services without
inquiring into citizenship status and not participating in the investigation
of sanctuaries does not conflict with the administration of federal policy.
Some opponents of the sanctuary resolutions charge that declaring a
city a sanctuary risks opening the "floodgates" to illegal aliens.228 If that
charge were true, the sanctuary resolutions should be preempted on the
grounds that they conflict with and frustrate the aim of the INA to stem
the flow of illegal aliens. To support such a position, empirical data
would need to be examined; unsubstantiated allegations should not suf-
fice. No known study has been done on the impact of sanctuary resolu-
tions on the flow of illegal aliens. The National Commissioner of the
INS, Alan Nelson, "knows of no way in which the INS operations have
been hampered by similar declarations of sanctuary in other cities, in-
or other refugees by federal officials 'to the extent legally possible.'" A City of Sanctuary,
supra note 47, at 3, col. 4.
225. The city dog catcher of National City, California, has detained undocumented resi-
dents. Despite supervision by the local police department, sometimes United States citizens
are detained. While the city claims that it detains people if during an investigation they do not
speak English and produce no home address, critics claim that people are stopped simply
because they "looked Mexican."
Although there is no law giving police-or other municipal employees, like dog
catchers-the authority to enforce immigration laws, neither is there a law saying
that they don't have the authority. Many city police departments, including those in
Los Angeles and Chicago, have responded to this legal twilight zone by refusing to
aid INS officials, unless the undocumented resident has been involved in a crime.
"Immigration enforcement is solely [the INS's] responsibility," says Captain Robert
Stebbins of the Santa Ana, California, Police Department, Stebbins adds that he
doesn't want the undocumented in Santa Ana to fear the police. "Anyone in our
city," he says, "is entitled to the full protection of the law."
Hernandez, A Dogged Attack On Immigration, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 1986, at 10-12 (brackets
in original). The activity of this "animal control officer" has taken a bigger bite at the federal
field of interest than the city sanctuary resolutions.
226. Since the INS has been charged by Congress to enforce the INA, a much stronger
argument can be made that supplemental local enforcement action conflicts with the federal
scheme as opposed to the absence of local enforcement and that withdrawal may be required
since Congress has not expressly deputized cities as agents of the INS.
227. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
228. See Council Votes, supra note 22, at 31, col. 3.
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cluding Chicago and New York." '22 9 No studies have been found that
document a mass pilgrimage of illegal aliens during the period between
adoption and rescission of the Los Angeles sanctuary resolution nor any
articles documenting a decline in the flow since its rescission. No court
should preempt a state or city enactment on such specious claims. Far
from opening the floodgates, the resolutions merely recognize and deal
with "the problems of the thousands of political refugees who are in our
midst today, living, working and raising families beside the rest of us."23 0
If passage through these gates is of any concern, a court should defer to
Congress, the branch better designed to make such findings and the
branch empowered to adopt appropriate legislation.
Underscoring this whole analysis, careful attention should be paid to
the force of these city council actions. They are not binding ordinances
but rather nonbinding resolutions without legal impact."' Although
lacking in force, the resolutions could conceivably frustrate a federal
scheme. That of course is not the test. Certain empirical facts would at
least need to be alleged. The preposterousness of such allegations, how-
ever, should provide nothing more than chuckles for some judge's law
clerk.
232
V. CONCLUSION
Although the city sanctuary resolutions could be viewed as pre-
empted in their entirety, such a position is the least maintainable conclu-
sion because portions of the resolutions deal with uniquely local activity
which is ill suited for federal interference. A view that certain provisions
risk preemption if certain empirical assertions are supported is a more
reasonable position. Finally, the most reasonable position is that none of
the resolutions nor any of their provisions are subject to preemption. A
court faced with a case seeking to preempt the sanctuary resolutions dis-
cussed in this Comment should refuse to decide the case. Since it is con-
gressional intent the courts seek to discern, in questions as close as these,
229. Plans to Penalize L.A., supra note 24, pt. II, at 1, col. 5.
230. City of Refuge, supra note 129, at 5, col. 4. As a practical matter, "Los Angeles is no
less a sanctuary for the world's refugees than it was before the City Council" rescinded its
resolution. Common Sense on Sanctuaries, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, pt. V, at 4, col. 1.
231. See supra note 170.
232. See supra note 165. The xenophobia and isolationism that influences immigration law
and city dog catchers may render these otherwise preposterous claims sufficiently potential or
probable to be judicially palatable.
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courts should put the crystal ball in the closet and hand potential liti-
gants the addresses of their representatives in Congress and in city hall.
Daniel D. McMillan*
* Special thanks to my beloved wife, Gianna J. Brown-McMillan, for her comments and
support.
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APPENDIX A
City of Berkeley - Sanctuary Resolution
RESOLUTION FOR COUNCIL ACTION
DECLARING BERKELEY A CITY OF
REFUGE
(1) WHEREAS, the Bay Area has become a place of refuge for
thousands of Central American Refugees who are flee-
ing the brutality of the governments of their own coun-
tries of Guatemala and El Salvador; and
(2) WHEREAS, these refugees have a well-founded fear of persecution if
returned to their country of origin; and
(3) WHEREAS, various churches, meetings and other religious groups,
with the support of many individuals within the uni-
versity and labor communities, and the community at
large, have responded to the needs of these refugees
with advocacy, protection and support; and
(4) WHEREAS, these groups and individuals have acted in a way they
consider morally and legally correct and in the best
tradition of our country, which was founded on the
principles of providing a safe haven for those fleeing
political oppression; and
(5) WHEREAS, the City of Berkeley, on November 10, 1971, stated it
"will support any congregation in Berkeley which
engages in sanctuary" (for those who refused to fight
in the Vietnam war).
(6) THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley reaf-
.firms its support for the principle of sanctuary and for
those groups which engage in this time-honored tradi-
tion of humanitarian assistance, and
(7) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley commend
the following groups which have declared public sanc-
tuary for Central American refugees:
Bartimaeus Community Church
Calvary Presbyterian Church
Fellowship of Unitarian Universalists
First Unitarian Church
Newman Hall/Holy Spirit Parish
The Religious Society of Friends, Berkeley Monthly
Meeting
St. John's Presbyterian Church
St. Joseph the Workman Church
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St. Mark's Episcopal Church
Strawberry Creek Friends Meeting
Trinity Methodist Church
Unitas House
University Lutheran Chapel
The Graduate Assembly at the University of
California at Berkeley
The Barrington Hall Co-op
(8) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley express
its support for any other group which chooses to de-
clare public sanctuary for Central American refugees;
and
(9) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the people of Berkeley be en-
couraged to work with the existing sanctuaries to pro-
vide the necessary housing, transportation, food,
medical aid, legal assistance and friendship that will be
needed; and
(10) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that no employee of the City of
Berkeley will violate the established sanctuaries by as-
sisting investigations, public or clandestine, by engag-
ing in or assisting with arrests for alleged violation of
immigration laws by the refugees in the sanctuaries or
by those offering sanctuary, or by refusing established
public services to the established sanctuaries; and
(11) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the sanctuary originally of-
fered by the churches be expanded to include the entire
city and that Berkeley become A CITY OF REFUGE;
and
(12) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the City of Berkeley extend
an invitation to the other cities of this country to join in
the offer of sanctuary so that the United States of
America may once more serve as a place of refuge for
oppressed people.
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APPENDIX B
City of Madison, Wisconsin - Sanctuary Resolution
Resolution reaffirming support for efforts to
refugees fleeing El Salvador and
Guatamala [sic]
(1) WHEREAS, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees has defined -the conditions of political refugee
as "any person who owing to a well-grounded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group or of a
political opinion, is outside the country of his(her) na-
tionality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, is un-
willing to avail himself of the protection of that
country"; and
(2) WHEREAS, the United States Congress has adopted this convention
in the Refugee Act of 1980; and
(3) WHEREAS, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees has
recognized that persons fleeing El Salvador and
Guatamala [sic] are bona fide political refugees, yet
fewer than two percent are being granted that status by
the U.S. Immigration Service; and
(4) WHEREAS, deportation of those seeking asylum has often meant
disappearance or death upon their return home; and
(5) WHEREAS, members of those religious communities offering sanc-
tuary to the refugees believe themselves to be acting
not in civil disobedience but under the law of the land;
and
(6) WHEREAS, both refugees and sanctuary workers in Texas, Ari-
zona, Washington, New York, California and Penn-
sylvania have been detained or indicted in recent days;
and
(7) WHEREAS, within the City of Madison, we have both refugees and
sanctuary providers for whom the fear of deportation
and the threat of arrest have an increasing immediacy;
and
(8) WHEREAS, the Common Council passed a resolution on June 3,
1983 in support of those sanctuaries when first refu-
gees came to our City;
(9) NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Common Coun-
cil of the City of Madison reaffirms that resolution, de-
clares Madison a City of refuge and supports the
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religious communities of the City of Madison in their
efforts to provide sanctuary; and
(10) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the people of Madison will
not condone for its own citizens who are providing
sanctuary the harrassment, indictments or arrests
which have been experienced by sanctuary workers in
other cities at the instigation of the U.S. Immigration
Service; and
(11) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that no employee of the City of
Madison will violate the established sanctuaries by as-
sisting in investigations, public or clandestine, by en-
gaging in or assisting with arrests for alleged violation
of immigration laws by the refugees in the sanctuaries
or by those offering sanctuary, or by refusing estab-
lished public services to the established sanctuaries;
and
(12) BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Madison Common
Council urges the Immigration Service to provide the
refugees with the status of "extended voluntary depar-
ture", so that they may live among us free of the threat
of deportation until conditions allow their return
home.
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APPENDIX C
City of Los Angeles - Sanctuary Resolution
RESOLUTION
(1) WHEREAS, the United States of America has provided an enduring
symbol of freedom for generations of people from
other countries who fear persecution in their native
land on the basis of their political beliefs; and
(2) WHEREAS, the United States Congress reaffirmed this tradition in
the provision of the Refugee Act of 1980 which recog-
nized the right to asylum of the refugee, defined as
"any person who is unable or unwilling to return to
his/her country because of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particu-
lar social group or political opinion"; and,
(3) WHEREAS, in the definition of refugee employed by the federal Ref-
ugee Act of 1980, Congress specifically intended to in-
clude political refugees and exclude economic refugees
with respect to the issue of asylum; and
(4) WHEREAS, refugee policy is primarily a responsibility of the Fed-
eral government, but local communities and local gov-
ernments sustain the fiscal and social impact of large
numbers of immigrants seeking asylum from persecu-
tion; and
(5) WHEREAS, the climate of fear prevalent among Central American
refugees presently living in Los Angeles may poten-
tially impair the efficiency of City government agen-
cies, disturb the efforts of law enforcement agencies to
resolve pending cases, and generally contradict the
ideals of diversity and tolerance to which the City of
Los Angeles subscribes;
(6) NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the City of Los An-
geles reaffirms the traditional American ideal of pro-
viding refuge here in the United States for people from
other countries who fear persecution in their native
land on the basis of their political beliefs; and be it
further
(7) RESOLVED, that the City of Los Angeles without endorsing any of
the contending forces [within] any country goes on
record in opposition to the deportation of known law-
abiding refugees who have fled their homelands for
fear of losing their lives; and be it further
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(8) RESOLVED, that the City of Los Angeles reaffirms its support of
H.R. 822 (Moakley) and S. 377 (De Concini), which
would establish as official policy the suspension of de-
portation provided such is consistent with the Refugee
Act of 1980; a position consistent with a previously ap-
proved City Council action including such in the City
of Los Angeles' 1984-85 Federal Legislative Program;
and be it further
(9) RESOLVED, that the City of Los Angeles appreciates the humanita-
rian work of private social service and religious institu-
tions such as United University Church, First
Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, Sepulveda Unita-
rian Church, Emerson Unitarian Church, Temple Shir
Shalom, and Shir Chadash New Reform Congrega-
tion, which have provided assistance to Central Ameri-
can refugees in the Los Angeles area; and be it further
(10) RESOLVED, that the City Council finds that immigration and ref-
ugee policy is a matter of Federal jurisdiction; that
Federal employees, not City employees, should be con-
sidered responsible for implementation of immigration
and refugee policy; and further that the City Council
directs City employees to exclude refugee status as a
consideration in their daily activities and routine deal-
ings with the public, and with the proviso that this di-
rective should not be construed as sanctioning the
violation of any law or encouraging interference in law
enforcement efforts; and be it further
(11) RESOLVED, that the City Council commends the Chief of Police
and the Los Angeles Police Department for adopting a
policy of excluding consideration of the refugee status
of crime victims and witnesses who are law-abiding
from the Department's routine law enforcement activi-
ties; that the City Council urges wider public dissemi-
nation of this policy, in English and Spanish; and that
the City Council further reaffirms the Department's
policy of detaining and arresting suspected criminals,
regardless of their citizenship status, and reporting to
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, only
those undocumented aliens booked for multiple misde-
meanor offenses, high grade misdemeanors, or felony
offenses; and be it further
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(12) RESOLVED, that the City of Los Angeles supports, in concept,
legislation which would clarify the responsibility of the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to ap-
prove asylum for applicants on the basis of the defini-
tion of "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980 relating
to a legitimate fear of persecution in his or her native
country, without regard to the political direction of the
current government in his or her native country and
without consideration of the relationship between cur-
rent Administration in this country and the current
government in the refugee's country of origin; and fur-
thermore that this concept be included in next year's
Federal Legislative Program; and be it further
(13) RESOLVED, that the City Council recognizes the many demands
placed upon the City's limited fiscal resources by cur-
rent citizens residing in Los Angeles, and therefore
urges the President and Congress to give greater con-
sideration in their deliberations to the fiscal needs of
large urban areas such as Los Angeles which have
borne a disproportionate share of the cost burden re-
sulting from Federal refugee policies; and be it further
(14) RESOLVED, that the City Council directs the Human Relations
Commission to submit an annual report, commencing
in November 1986, on the status and unmet needs of
immigrants and refugees residing in the City of Los
Angeles; and be it further
(15) RESOLVED, that the City Council in adopting the policies in this
resolution, calls upon the people of the City of Los An-
geles to reaffirm the American tradition of providing
refuge to law-abiding persons who have fled their na-
tive country for fear of persecution on the basis of their
political beliefs, and hereby declares that Los Angeles,
as part of a national policy of providing refuge to per-
sons seeking asylum from political and not economic
persecution, is a City of Sanctuary for such persons.
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APPENDIX D
Los Angeles Compromise Resolution
MOTION
(1) WHEREAS, the United States of America has provided an enduring
symbol of freedom for generations of people from
other countries who fear persecution in their native
land; and,
(2) WHEREAS, the United States Congress reaffirmed this tradition in
the provision of the Refugee Act of 1980 which recog-
nized the right of asylum for refugees, defined as "any
person.., who is unable or unwilling to return to...
(his/her country of nationality) because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion"; and,
(3) WHEREAS, refugees living in Los Angeles are afraid to contact lo-
cal government agencies due to their fear of deporta-
tion, and the refugees' reluctance to contact and
cooperate with government agencies has hampered the
ability of such agencies to provide vital services to all
persons, citizens as well as noncitizens; and,
(4) WHEREAS, the City Council welcomes the opportunity to work
with the Federal Government to resolve these
problems and expects that all Federal agencies that are
involved in the service or detention of refugees will
comply with all municipal regulations including zon-
ing, land use, fire and building codes.
I THEREFORE MOVE that:
1. The Sanctuary Resolution adopted by the City
Council on November 27, 1985 (C.F. 85-1948) is
hereby rescinded; and,
2. The City adopt the attached policy on refugees.
CITY COUNCIL POLICY ON REFUGEES
(1) RESOLVED, that the City Council reaffirms its support of H.R. 822
(Moakley) and S. 377 (De Concini), which would es-
tablish as official policy the temporary suspension of
deportation of certain Salvadoran nationals, provided
such is consistent with the Refugee Act of 1980; that
this position is consistent with a previously approved
City Council action including such in the City of Los
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Angeles' 1984-85 Federal Legislative Program; and be
it further
(2) RESOLVED, that although the City Council recognizes that immi-
gration and refugee policies are a matter of Federal ju-
risdiction, and that Federal employees, not City
employees, are responsible for the implementation of
immigration and refugee policies; nevertheless, the
City is burdened with the fiscal and social impacts of
many refugees living within the city; and be it further
(3) RESOLVED, that the City Council recognizes the many demands
placed upon the City's limited fiscal resources by refu-
gees residing in Los Angeles, and, therefore, urges the
President and Congress to give greater consideration in
their deliberations to the fiscal needs of large urban ar-
eas such as Los Angeles which have borne a dispropor-
tionate share of the cost burden resulting from the
Federal Government's failure to provide the resources
necessary to more adequately control the immigration
of refugees; and be it further
(4) RESOLVED, that the City Council reaffirms its policy of excluding
refugee status of crime victims and witnesses from the
City's routine law enforcement activities and reports to
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service only
those undocumented aliens who commit multiple mis-
demeanors, serious misdemeanors, or felony offenses;
and be it further
(5) RESOLVED, that the City Council reaffirms that it is the City's pol-
icy for its employees to provide services, especially
those involving public health and safety, to all the pub-
lic notwithstanding their individual refugee status with
the proviso that this should not be construed as sanc-
tioning the violation of any law or encouraging inter-
ference in law enforcement efforts; and be it further
(6) RESOLVED, that the City Council supports the dissemination of
this policy to all communities in the City in order that
all refugees will be encouraged to cooperate with the
City especially in law enforcement investigations.
MOTION
(1) WHEREAS, the City Council recognizes that the full voluntary par-
ticipation and cooperation of the undocumented alien
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community is indispensable if the City is to fulfill its
responsibility to protect and serve the entire commu-
nity; and,
(2) WHEREAS, the City Council recognizes its responsibility to address
the needs and problems imposed on City government
as a result of the increasing numbers of undocumented
aliens within our City limits; and,
(3) WHEREAS, the City Council recognizes that this increase in un-
documented aliens has created not only law enforce-
ment, housing, health and other social problems, but a
climate of tension and ill feelings among our residents;
and,
(4) WHEREAS, the City Council is committed to a comprehensive ef-
fort to solve this problem and believes that an action
plan to address these problems is mandatory and
should be developed immediately.
I THEREFORE MOVE that the City Council:
1. Create and appoint a task force comprised of 1
member from each of the 15 council districts, nomi-
nated by each member of the City Council, to address
the City's problems due to an increasing number of
residents from a multitude of backgrounds into a way
of life that expands the social and economic opportuni-
ties and well being for all. Such review to include, but
not be limited to:
a. housing
b. health and welfare
c. employment
d. education
e. law enforcement
f. cooperation with all levels of government
2. Direct the Chief Legislative Analyst to provide
staff for the task force to assist in its organization and
activities.
3. That the task force be instructed to develop a com-
prehensive policy for dealing with problems relating to
immigration in the City of Los Angeles and to report
its findings and recommendations to the City Council
no less than quarterly.
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APPENDIX E
City of Berkeley - Resolution of Support for Sanctuary
WHEREAS: A number of sailors from the U.S.S. Coral Sea have asked
that sanctuaries be established.
WHEREAS: The University Lutheran Chapel of Berkeley with the sup-
port of ten Bay Area Churches has announced its
availability as a place of sanctuary for "any person
who is unwilling to participate in military action," and
has issued a statement indicating the nature of the
sanctuary offered.
THEREFORE:
1. The City of Berkeley supports those men who de-
cide to take sanctuary.
2. The City of Berkeley supports the sanctuary al-
ready established at the University Lutheran Chapel
and will support any congregation in Berkeley which
engages in Sanctuary.
3. The City of Berkeley is also willing to provide a
facility for sanctuary. The nature of that sanctuary
will be as defined by the statement of the University
Lutheran Chapel and its supporting churches. A com-
mittee designated by the University Lutheran Chapel
and supporting churches will work with the city to find
an appropriate facility and to operate that facility in
line with the sanctuary statement.
4. The City of Berkeley encourages the People of
Berkeley to work with the existing sanctuary to pro-
vide the bedding, food, medical aid, legal help and
friendship that the men may need.
5. No Berkeley City employee will violate the estab-
lished sanctuaries by assisting in investigations, public
or clandestine, of engaging in or assisting arrests for
violation of federal laws relating to military service on
the premises offering sanctuary, or by refusing estab-
lished public service.
6. These motions are intended as support for the ac-
tions of the men on the U.S.S. Coral Sea and are not
intended to influence them into specific actions such as
sanctuary.
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Appendix F
Chart Comparisons-Sanctuary Resolutions*
Provision Los Angeles, CA Berkeley, CA Madison, WN
original / compromise
1) Establishes the city as a X X X
"Sanctuary" or "Refuge."
2) Commends local groups X X X
providing sanctuary.
3) No consideration of X X X X
citizenship status in
rendering city services.
4) Directs city employees to X' X1 X X
respect sanctuaries by not
cooperating with
investigations or arrests.
5) Supports pending federal X2  X 2  X
legislation or recommends
change in federal policy.
6) Statements of deference. X4  X,
7) Statements of defiance. X3
8) Oppose deportation. X
9) Statements in support of X
6
sanctuary.
10) Other X, X
7
1. The Los Angeles resolution does not do this directly but it does applaud the
police department's policy of not reporting refugees arrested for minor misde-
meanors.
2. The Los Angeles resolution supports pending legislation that would grant
extended involuntary departure status to El Salvadorans; recommends expanding
legislation to include Guatemalans; requests grants of federal aid to cities
providing residence to disporportionate numbers of refugees and requests
clarification of the INS role in asylum applications.
3. Recommends that the INS give extended voluntary departure to certain Central
American refugees.
4. Recognizes immigration policy is a federal question; directs city employees not to
violate any laws.
5. Refuses to condone INS harrassment of city residents involved in providing
sanctuary.
6. Supports any group publicly declaring itself a sanctuary; encourages people
working with existing sanctuaries; invites other cities to become cities of
sanctuary.
7. Reaffirms American ideal of providing sanctuary to those facing persecution.
* For purposes of categorization, the following provisions have been placed under the
following labels for discussion in the text:
Commendation provisions: 2)
Noncooperation provisions: 3), 4)
Policy Statement provisions: 5), 6), 7), 8), 9), 10)
Symbolic provisions: 1)
